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FREEDOM OF CHOICE IN ACCOMMODATION

TOWARD FREEDOM OF CHOICE IN PLACES OF
PUBLIC AND PRIVATE ACCOMMODATION
Alfred Avins*
I.

CURRENT INFRINGEMENTS ON FREEDOM OF CHOICE

The last decade has witnessed an acceleration of the Negro
drive to eliminate racial distinctions in both public and private
places, accompanied by ever more serious incursions into individual
freedom of choice of association, made by such drive. The facts
are common knowledge to all who read the newspapers. However,
a review of several of the more striking incidents will serve to
place the law in a more intelligible context.
The earliest object of widespread pressure during the 1960's
has been restaurants and lunch counters. The new phenomenon of
a "sit-in" was developed to put pressure on such businesses. This
author has had occasion to deal with such tactics in prior articles.1
Such tactics have led to the closing of the business, which Negroes
hailed as a victory.2 In another instance, 50 club-wielding Negro
students invaded a drive-in restaurant at 3:45 A.M. and battered
cars there, thus terrorizing the customers.3 On occasion, to counteract these demonstrations, white students staged counter-sit-ins 4
and their own boycotts.5
Another form of retaliation against variety stores with segregated lunch counters was tried by Negro students in Virginia.
They entered the stores, filled baskets with merchandise, and
took them to the check out point. After the cashier had rung up
* B.A. 1954, Hunter College; LL.B. 1956, Columbia Univ.; LL.M. 1957,

New York Univ.; M.L. 1961, J.S.D. 1962, University of Chicago; Ph.D.
1965, University of Cambridge. Member of the New York, District of
Columbia, Florida, Illinois and U.S. Supreme Court Bars. Former
Assistant District Attorney, New York County; former Special Deputy
Attorney-General, New York State; former Special Counsel, Virginia
Commission on Constitutional Government; former Professor of Law,
Memphis State University. Author: The Law of AWOL (1957); Open
Occupancy vs. Forced Housing (1963); The Reconstruction Amendments Debates (1967); Employee Mffisconduct in India and Commonwealth (1968), and numerous articles in law reviews.
1 See Avins, The Right Not to Listen, 51 AB.A.J. 656 (1965); Avins &
Crutchfield, PrimaFacie Tort and Injunction-New Remedies Against
Sitdowns, 24 GA.B.J. 20 (1961), 23 ALA. LAW. 163 (1962).
2 N.Y. Times, Feb. 7, 1960, at 35, col. 1.
3 N.Y. Times, March 6, 1960, at 43, col. 3.
4 N.Y. Times, Feb. 5, 1960, at 12, col.3.
5 N.Y. Times, Feb. 14, 1960, at 44, col. 7 (city ed.).
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the items, they refused to pay for the goods, forcing the clerks
to return them to the shelves, and delaying service to other patrons. 6
These sit-in and other demonstrations were praised by world socialist leaders 7 and Governor Nelson Rockefeller of New York.8 A
Negro judge from New York praised them as a second "Boston Tea
Party.9
During the opening period of the Kennedy administration,
several African diplomats driving from New York City to Washington were refused service in Maryland restaurants along U.S. Route
40. The total distance between these two cities is about 225 miles
and it takes slightly more than four hours to drive. However, of this
distance only about 88 miles are in Maryland, which would take
about an hour and a half to drive. Bus passengers on non-stop busses
have been known to survive this journey without food or drink
and still arrive in excellent condition. Presumably African diplomats would not die of hunger either. Nevertheless the State
Department publicly called on the Maryland legislature to enact
a law forbidding racial discrimination in restaurants and "public
accommodations" for the offended diplomats and, while they were
at it, for American Negroes as well. Such a bill had been beaten
three times. However, the department warned that unless African
diplomats were served, the United Nations might leave New York
City.' 0 President Kennedy added his support to such a bill." So
did other officials, but they refused to guide the rebuffed diplomats
to restaurants on Route 40 that were willing to serve them.12 In
spite of the fact that some restaurants did serve Negroes, the State
Department pressured the others.'3 On the legislative front, the
state legislature ignored local integrationist groups 14 and refused
once again to pass the bill.'5 But two years later such a law was
passed. 16 Rep. Adam Clayton Powell's contribution to solving the
problem of diplomats was to criticize the small number of Negroes
7
invited to dinners and receptions held for them.'
Not all of Maryland favored anti-discrimination legislation.
6 N.Y. Times, April 25, 1961, at 30, col. 1 (city ed.).
7 N.Y. Times, May 1, 1960, at 78, col. 4 (city ed.).
8 N.Y. Times, April 13, 1960, at 32, col. 3.
9 N.Y. Times, April 13, 1960, at 61, col. 4 (city ed.).
10 N.Y. Times, Sept. 14, 1961, at 1, col. 8.
11 N.Y. Times, Sept. 26, 1961, at 5, col 3.
12 N.Y. Times, Sept. 27, 1961, at 3, col. 6. See also N.Y. Times, Aug. 17,
1961, at 51, col. 1 (pressure on Howard Johnson chain).
13 N.Y. Times, Oct. 8, 1961, at 56, col. 4.
14 N.Y. Times, Feb. 12, 1960, at 15, col. 2.
15 N.Y. Times, March 11, 1962, at 70, col. 6 (city ed.).
16 N.Y. Times, June 16, 1963, at 59, col. 5.
17 N.Y. Times, April 29, 1961, at 4, col. 5.
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A Washington suburb has been embroiled in controversy over
whether such legislation should be retained. 8 In Cambridge, Maryland, a referendum to open restaurants to Negroes lost by 1,720
for to 1,994 against, although the Negro vote was 587 for to 32
against.19
Restaurants have also been under attack in other sections. The
problems of Lester Maddox, who closed his restaurant in Atlanta
rather than serve Negroes, are well known. It was clear that many
of Maddox's customers, who stood outside his restaurant and
cheered him, did not want to eat with Negroes. 20 Federal Bureau of Investigation agents questioned so many customers about
Maddox's practices that his business fell off by one-third. 21
The New York City Commission on Intergroup Relations accused a number of restaurants of subtle discrimination against
African delegates to the United Nations by serving them in undesirable locations or so slowly that they would walk out. However,
this charge was denied.2 2 New York has had an anti-discrimination
law for many years,2 3 but apparently this law was being widely
-evaded.
Another favorite business which attracts integration drives is
the hotel industry. It was alleged that a Houston hotel had refused
to honor a reservation of a Negro federal official, although the
hotel said that this was merely a clerical error.2 4 Of course, hotels
have refused to accommodate guests for other reasons also. One
hotel in Selma, Alabama, declined to give a room to a Norwegian
-newspaper reporter because he came from the "nation which gave
the Rev. Dr. Martin Luther King the Nobel Peace Prize." It was not
alleged that the reporter had any hand in this; the hotel owner
simply wanted him to stay in Norway.25 However, economic arguments often proved persuasive; thus, some Atlanta hotels desegre.gated to obtain convention business. 28 An Anti-Defamation League
report found a four-fifths drop in Florida hotels discriminating
against Jews between 1953 and 1960.27 Indeed, a Negro actress had
18 N.Y. Times, April 15, 1963, at 13, col. 1.
19 N.Y. Times, June 24, 1963, at 29, col. 1 (city ed.); id. Oct. 3, 1963, at 20,
20
21

22
23
24
25

col. 1 (city ed.).
N.Y. Times, Aug. 14, 1964, at 25, col. 1; id. Feb. 8, 1965, at 18, col 3.
N.Y. Times, Nov. 13, 1964, at 19, col. 2.

N.Y. Times, June 6, 1960, at 1, col. 2; id. June 9, 1960, at 67, col. 3.

N.Y. CIVm RiGHTS LAW, § 40 (McKinney 1954).
N.Y. Times, Jan. 20, 1962, at 11, col 5.
N.Y.Times, March 23, 1965, at 27, col. 8.

26 N.Y. Times, March 11, 1962, at 63, col. 5.
27 N.Y. Times, April 25, 1960, at 2, col. 3 (city ed.).
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occasion in 1962 to label a charge of hotel discrimination against her
28
in a Maine community where she played to be completely false.
Nevertheless, government action to prohibit hotel discrimination has been widespread. The New York State Commission Against
Discrimination acted to prevent a resort from issuing a brochure
saying: "Serving Christian clientele since 1911."29 However, after
much agonizing, including 56 staff study days of examining hotel
registers for 20 years and measuring distances between 37 resort
hotels and nearby churches and synagogues, the commission concluded that it was lawful for resorts to issue brochures stating
"churches near by. 8 0 The Anti-Defamation League and the Commission forced a private religious club not to accept conventions
on their premises as the price of being let alone by the Commission.81
It is difficult to think of a business whose policies have been
immune from integration drives. Camps are a good example of
facilities where integration has been used primarily for social
purposes.82 Of course, interracial camps have long been advertised,3 but government has now stepped in to force all camps to
integrate. For example, it was ruled in New Jersey that day camps
could not discriminate. 84 The New Jersey State Division on Civil
Rights also ordered a private, nonprofit camp for the blind, run
by blind men for the purpose of giving other blind persons free
vacations, to give a Negro a free two-week vacation, on the ground
that it had discriminated against him based on color. The division
did not explain how the camp's blind directors could see his color,
especially since he had only applied by letter. 85
Probably the most hilarious use of the New Jersey Civil Rights
Law occurred recently when a Negro woman complained to state
officials that she had been turned away from a nudist camp because
of color. After an investigation, the Division on Civil Rights held
that a nudist camp was a place of public accommodation and would
have to admit the woman. 86 Perhaps the camp felt that the color
contrast would be inharmonious. At any rate, it is difficult to believe
that the need of Negroes for nudist camps is so pressing as to
require the expenditure of state funds for the purpose.
28
29

80
31
s2

N.Y. Times, Aug. 1, 1962, at 23, col. 1.
N.Y. Times, Feb. 1, 1960, at 42, col. 5; id. Aug. 2, 1960, p. 8, col. 2.
N.Y. Times, Jan. 8, 1960, at 29, col. 4 (city ed.).
N.Y. Times, Dec. 19, 1959, at 27, col. 1.
See N.Y. Times, March 20, 1958, at 31, col. 5.

See e.g., N.Y. Times, April 23, 1961, § 6 (Magazine) at 105.
N.Y. Times, March 17, 1965, at 52, col. 3; id. May 18, 1965, at 41, col 4.
35 N.Y. Times, Nov. 5, 1966, at 33, col. 1; id. Feb. 25, 1967, at 29, col 8.
36 N.Y. Times, June 16, 1966, at 49, col. 8; id. June 22, 1966, at 14, col 5.
33
34
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Amusement parks have also been the subject of demonstrations
for integration. One well-publicized demonstration occurred in
Maryland, where hundreds of patrons cheered the owner's attempt
to keep some demonstrating clergymen out of the park.37 An integrated amusement park in Oklahoma lost so much money that it
had to resegregate to avoid bankuptcy.3 8 Suburbs enacted residence
restrictions to keep Negroes out of their local parks. 9 Nevertheless
in spite of this sentiment, the federal government has barred all
segregated groups from federal recreational facilities. 40
The same drive has been made against swimming pools. One
manager of a privately-owned pool was sentenced to five days in
jail and a $200 fine for discrimination. 4 1 But pool desegregation has
not noticeably improved race relations. In Baltimore two Negro
42
orphans were jeered out of a formerly all-white municipal pool,
43
while in Chicago pool desegregation caused a race riot.
Negro groups have boycotted segregated football games,4 and
one congressman introduced a bill to bar segregated teams from
using any federal stadium.45 The Museum of Modern Art has
refused to lend pictures to segregated groups; the Metropolitan
46
Opera has likewise refused to play before segregated audiences.
A discotheque has been the subject of investigation for discrimination on the complaint of an interracial couple. 47 In North Dakota,
one bartender was sentenced to 30 days in jail and a fine of $100
for discrimination against Negroes who wanted drinks. 48 In Baltimore, a tavern was picketed by Negro groups for serving only
whites. It then changed its policy to serve only Negroes, but these
Negro groups continued to demonstrate. Finally, the tavern agreed
to integrate. 4 9
Transportation is another industry where the integration drive
has been widely publicized. Bus boycotts 0 and federal orders to
37

N.Y. Times, July 5, 1963, at 1, col 2 (city ed.).

38 N.Y. Times, July 25, 1963, at 11, col. 7.
89 N.Y. Times, July 20, 1960, at 31, col 1.
40 N.Y. Times, April 22, 1961, at 10, col. 3 (city ed.).

41 N.Y. Times, May 13, 1959, at 7, col 5 (city ed.)-

42 N.Y. Times, June 25, 1963, at 13, col 1.

43 N.Y. Times, July 31, 1960, at 15, col 8.
44 N.Y. Times, Aug. 15, 1961, at 36, col 1.

45 N.Y. Times, March 6, 1962, at 39, col 1 (city ed.).
46 N.Y. Times, Aug. 22, 1962, at 28, col 1.
47 N.Y. Times, April 9, at 3, col 6 (city ed.).
48 N.Y. Times, Dec. 3, 1961, at 58, col 4; id. Dec. 7, 1961, at 36, col 6 (city
ed.).
49 N.Y. Times, July 6, 1966, at 15, col 1.
50 See e.g., N.Y. Times, March 5, 1962, at 20, col 6 (city ed.).
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integrate buses5' have been widely publicized. But the ingenuity
of businessmen in evading unpalatable regulations is unbounded.
The Chairman of the New York City Commission on Human Rights
complained that taxicab drivers were passing Negroes by and were
driving with "off-duty" signs in Negro neighborhoods. 52 The
drivers alleged that they were afraid of being robbed if they stopped
in Negro areas. But the mayor ordered cabs to have a device which
kept the "off-duty" sign on for half an hour, during which no
passengers could be picked up, to discourage use of this sign in
Negro neighborhoods. 53
Integration has reached the very young. The New York City
Welfare Commissioner threatened to cut off funds from adoption
agencies which refused to accept Negro children.54 Yet the one
agency handling colored children found great difficulty in placing
them. 5 The sick have not been spared. As early as 1961 hospitals
in Chicago were sued in federal court to force them to integrate. 56
The following year both the N.A.A.C.P. and the Department of
Justice sued to prevent private hospitals which had received federal, state, or local grants from segregating or discriminating against
Negroes in any way. 57 With the advent of the Civil Rights Act of
1964, the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare threatened
to cut off hospitals from federal funds unless they integrated staff
and patients. Inspectors were dispatched around the country to
insure compliance. 5 The Department also threatened to cut off
Medicare funds, estimated to amount to 20 percent of hospital
budgets, unless full integration was achieved. The Department
guidelines forbade giving patients a choice as to whether they want
to share a room with a person of another race, and required abolition of dual facilities unless actually used bi-racially. 59
An aggravated instance of pressure for compulsory integration
occurred in respect to St. John's Episcopal Hospital in Brooklyn,
New York. Bishop De Wolfe originally decided to allow patients
in semi-private rooms to be placed in rooms with patients of the
5' See N.Y. Times, Aug. 12, 1961, at 41, col. 1.
52 N.Y. Times, March 6, 1966, at 95, col. 2; id. Dec. 10, 1966, at 28, col. 5.
See also id., Dec. 9, 1967, at 26, col. 3.
53 N.Y. Times, May 24, 1967, at 49, col. 8.
54 N.Y. Times, Dec. 1, 1960, at 63, col. 2 (city ed.).
55 N.Y. Times, Nov. 14, 1964, at 13, col. 5 (city ed.).
56 N.Y. Times, Feb. 11, 1961, at 24, col. 3 (city ed.).
57 N.Y. Times, May 9, 1952, at 1, col. 6; id. June 20, 1962, at 16, col. 3.
58 N.Y. Times, Sept. 2, 1965, at 21, col. 2; id. April 11, 1966, at 38, col. 3.

See also id. Jan. 20, 1968, at 60, col. 4 (HEW requires Alabama to
force private clinics treating welfare patients to eliminate separate
waiting rooms).
59 N.Y. Times, March 9, 1966, at 26, col. 1.
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same race if they so desired to "enjoy greater peace of mind."
The Urban League denounced this "particularly horrifying disclosure", whilb an unofficial church group called the decision "illegal,
immoral, and inefficient."6 The New York City Commission on
Human Rights started an immediate inquiry. 61 When the bishop
declared that "the principle of consent" had to be regarded in assigning a white or Negro patient to a room with a person of another
race, the executive director of the commission declared that "in
this day and age it is just a little ridiculous" to adhere to such a
62
principle.
The bishop reaffirmed the hospital's practice that the general
wards of the hospital are integrated but that if a person objects
to being placed in a semi-private room with someone of another
race, he is only placed in an integrated room if no other beds are
available, and he is then moved to a room with someone of the
same race when a bed becomes available there. Because of this 150
pickets from the N.A.A.C.P., C.O.R.E., the Drug and Hospital
Employees Union, and Negro churches, demonstrated in front of
the hospital.6 3 A vigil was also maintained by clergy and laity of
the church belonging to an unofficial church integrationist group
outside of the hospital.6 4 After pressure from these groups and from
the City Commission on Human Rights, the bishop capitulated,
revoked the "principle of consent," and ordered that semi-private
rooms be integrated regardless of the objections of patients. 65
The dead and their bereaved have been subjected to integrationist pressures. The Massachusetts State Commission Against
Discrimination and Attorney General took action against a cemetery for discriminating against non-whites although 5,000 persons
who had purchased burial plots contracted for such exclusivity.6 6
In Michigan, a court held that a cemetery had violated the civil
rights of a Negro when it refused to let him bury his mother in
an all-white burial ground.6 7 The Veterans Administration has
refused to contract with white undertakers unless they handle
Negro clients. 68 The directive from the Defense Department not
to deal with funeral homes unless they handled persons of all
races put Turner Air Force Base in Georgia in a quandry. The two
N.Y. Times, July 3, 1962, at 7. col. 6.
61 N.Y. Times, July 4, 1962, at 21, col. 1.
60

N.Y. Times, July 5, 1962, at 14, col. 6.
N.Y. Times, July 9, 1962, at 16, col. 7.
64 N.Y. Times, July 11, 1962, at 27, coL 1; id. July 12, 1962, at 18, col 1.
65 N.Y. Times, July 13, 1962, at 10, col. 2; id.July 19, 1962, at 24, col. 3.
66 N.Y. Times, Feb. 1, 1960, at 21, coL 6 (city ed.).
67 N.Y. Times, Sept. 14, 1966, at 23, col. 7; id. Dec. 7, 1966, at 38, col. 3.
68 N.Y. Times, June 23, 1962, at 21, col. 3.
62

63
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white establishments said that they would not handle Negro dead,
and two Negro homes said that they would not handle the white
dead. The base therefore cancelled all burial contracts and announced that cases would be handled on "an individual purchase
order basis with specific approval at the secretarial level of the
service." 69 This means that the Secretary of the Air Force would
have to take time out from reviewing contracts for billions of dollars
worth of supersonic jets to approve the burial of Airman Basic
John Doe at Turner Air Force Base. This would constitute a dubious
use of a busy official's time, to say the least.
The federal government has entered the compulsory integration
field in a variety of other ways. For example, when federal agencies rent space from private landlords, these agencies require the
landlords to sign a lease which contains a condition that he will
insert a clause in his leases with other tenants requiring them not
to discriminate or segregate on the grounds of race. In other words,
the landlord must coerce tenants who have nothing to do with the
federal government into changing their operations. The landlord is
required to "take such action.., as the contracting agency may
direct" in enforcing this clause; this may include cancellation of the
other private tenant's lease, with the landlord left with vacant
space.7 0 In one instance, a drug store gave up its
postal sub-station
71
contract rather than integrate a lunch counter.
Probably the most widely publicized government restriction
in recent years occurred in connection with the carrier Franklin
D. Roosevelt which, after more than three months in Vietnamese
waters on war duty, stopped to refuel at Capetown, South Africa,
on its way home. Originally, four days of shore leave had been
scheduled for the 3800 officers and men of the carrier, which
included about 200 Negroes. The city residents had spent weeks
planning hospitality for the men, and the sizable colored community had planned to entertain the Negroes aboard the ship. The day
before the ship docked, the Deputy Defense Secretary and Navy
Secretary yielded to integrationist groups and congressmen and
banned individual leave, requiring that sailors not be permitted
ashore except on integrated bus tours or for integrated athletic
events. 72 Since South African apartheid legislation prevented this,
the carrier had to cancel all leave. 73 This decision frustrated both
69 N.Y. Times, Aug. 18, 1963, at 31, col. 1 (city ed.).
70 Wall St. Journal, Feb. 4, 1963, at 1, col. 6.
71 N.Y. Times, Nov. 14, 1963, at 8, col 6.
72 N.Y. Times, Feb. 4, 1967, at 11, col. 1.
73 N.Y. Times, Feb. 5, 1967, at 1, col. 5. A Defense Department spokesman
said: "The Department of Defense has authorized liberty only for
participation in organized integrated activities during the visit of the
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white and Negro sailors, who had had no liberty in many months,
and angered both white and colored residents of Capetown, who
had prepared the biggest welcome ever given a ship in South
Africaj 4 When the ship announced that it would receive visitors,
over 100,000 townspeople of all races visited it for two days. Not
only were pro-government newspapers critical of the Defense Department, but opposition liberal newspapers condemned the cancellation as unrivaled in pettiness. Sixty crewmen were allowed
ashore-but only to donate blood, so that those who were prepared
to shed their blood had to donate it to get leave.7 5 Notwithstanding
this blunder, a few days later the missle-tracking ship Sword Knot,
with a crew of 56 whites and 11 Negroes, was kept standing off
Durban for eight days by the Defense Department and finally
ordered to Mombasa, Kenya, rather than being allowed to enter
South Africa, because the Department did not wish to allow the
crew shore liberty in Durban. The crew did not appreciate this
gesture at alL 76
In addition to integrating facilities, great pressure has been
brought to bear to compel personal sevices for Negroes. Barbers
have borne the weight of this drive. For example, the New York
State Commission Against Discrimination threatened a barber who
sought to discourage Negro patronage with a $500 fine and six
months in jail 7 An Ohio barber who did not want to serve Negroes
had to close his shop to avoid the effect of a state Civil Rights Commission order. Hundreds of Negro students picketed his shop to
force him to comply.78 In New York, a group of clergymen pressured five local barbers because Negroes had to drive to a city
fifteen miles away for a haircut.7 9 In spite of the fact that the District of Colombia had a law against barber discrimination, twenty
African diplomats complained that they had been refused service.
U.S.S. Franklin D. Roosevelt to Capetown. If no organized integrated
activities can be provided, there will be no liberty." Id. at 26, col 1.
74 N.Y. Times, Feb. 6, 1967, at 10, col 2.
75 N.Y. Times, Feb. 7, 1967, at 15, col. 1.
76 N.Y. Times, Feb. 6, 1967, at 4, col. 6 (city ed.). The following telegram
was sent from the ship to the Mayor of Durban: "We wish to express
our extreme displeasure over action taken by our Government in not
permitting our vessel to re-enter Durban as planned. Please convey
our gratitude to the people of Durban for their friendliness and hospitality during our previous visit. Request publication.
From every officer and an overwhelming majority of the crew."
77 N.Y. Times, Oct. 7, 1960, at 26, col. 4 (city ed.).
78 N.Y. Times, Feb. 24, 1962, at 22, col 8; id. Jan. 5, 1963, at 13, col. 1;
id., March 16, 1964, at 27, col. 3.
79 N.Y. Times, Oct. 3, 1963, at 28, col. 2 (city ed.).
80 N.Y. Times, June 9, 1963, at 51, col. 1.
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A New Hampshire barber was fined for refusing to serve a Negro
in that state.8 '
The fight against barbers has been particularly active in New
Jersey. Violence flared in the college town of Madison because of
a boycott and picketing by college students and faculty of five
barbershops which refused to serve Negroes. The barbers contended
that they were unqualified to cut Negro hair and that they would
lose business from white patrons by serving Negroes. They rejected
the proposal to hire a Negro barber because only two percent of
the potential clientele was Negro.8 The New Jersey Board of
Barber Examiners then issued a directive that a barber who could
not cut Negro hair was incompetent and would have his license
revoked. A barber association president replied that strict enforcement of this directive would require revocation of ninety percent of
the licenses in New Jersey.83 When the State Division on Civil
Rights ordered a local barber to give Negroes a haircut, 4 the
barber refused on the ground that this was a personal service
which could not be coerced, and he appealed to the courts. 85 The
protesting barbers, who originally only numbered five, grew to an
organization of 2,500 throughout the state by this time.86 Eventually,
the State Supreme Court ruled that barbers had to serve Negroes,
and the barbers reluctantly submitted.8 7 Indeed, the State Division
on Civil Rights even took action against a Negro barber who would
not serve Negroes for fear of losing white customers.88
An Illinois barber was acquitted in criminal court of racial
discrimination under a statute which provided penalties of six
months in jail and $1,000 fine. 89 Nevertheless, the state suspended
his license for the alleged discrimination of which a jury acquitted
90

him.

Other services have also been covered by anti-discrimination
drives. The New York State Board of Regents passed a rule making
it cause to revoke the license of a professional person under its
jurisdiction for discrimination based on race, creed, color or national
origin. The Regents supervise 20 professions, including medicine,
81 N.Y. Times, June 12, 1964, at 42, col. 1.

82 N.Y. Times, May 16, 1963, at 52, col. 4; N.Y. Journal-American, May 6,
1964, at 47, col. 7.
83 N.Y. Times, Aug. 6, 1964, at 8, col. 6 (city ed.).
84 N.Y. Times, Dec. 13, 1964, at 46, col. 1 (city ed.).
85 N.Y. Times, Dec. 22, 1964, at 21, col. 1.
86 N.Y. Times, Feb. 26, 1966, at 26, col. 5 (city ed.).
87 N.Y. Times, Feb. 22, 1966, at 1, col. 3; id. Feb. 27, 1966, at 71, col. 6.
88 N.Y. Times, July 16, 1966, at 27, col. 1.
89 N.Y. Times, Oct. 16, 1964, at 4, col. 5 (city ed.).
90 N.Y. Times, Dec. 2, 1964, at 43, col. 4; id. Jan. 5, 1965, at 20, col. 6.

FREEDOM OF CHOICE IN ACCOMMODATION
dentistry, nursing, pharmacy, engineering, public accounting, architecture, land surveying, psychology, optometry, veterinary medicine, and shorthand reporting.91 Much of this drive has hurt, rather
than helped, Negroes. It has been found that Negro businessmen
and professionals who depended on an almost exclusively Negro
92
trade have lost substantial business as a result of desegregation.
When Kentucky by executive order banned racial discrimination in
businesses and professions licensed by the state, the Negro funeral
93
association opposed it.
It is also difficult to see what practical benefit will result from
the orders to desegregate jails94 and private clubs.9 5 Moreover,
federal court orders such as one forbidding a state judge from
making special seating arrangements for white persons who did not
want to sit next to Negroes in the courtroom 5 can hardly benefit
Negroes either.
It is interesting to note that racial discrimination exists abroad
also. In Belgium, even though there is a law against discrimination
in public places, the law is often ignored, and African students and
employees of international organizations are frequently refused
service in hotels, movie theaters, restaurants, cafes, and bars.9 7
In Japan, in one town adjacent to an American air base, 38 out
of the 44 bars maintained a policy of serving only white airmen
because they would not patronize an establishment that served
Negroes. When Negro airmen conducted a sit-in at this base, police
narrowly averted a fight.98 When hotels in Southern Rhodesia
established a non-riacial policy, Africans flocked to hotel lounges
and bars, resulting in a sharp drop in the number of white customers. Managers complained that the Africans behaved poorly
and that the women were not properly dressed. After a few weeks
several of the hotels reverted to their prior practice of serving
only white persons. 99
91 N.Y. Times, Oct. 27, 1962, at 27, col. 1.
92 N.Y. Times, Jan. 26, 1965, at 19, col. 4.
93 N.Y. Times, June 28, 1963, at 11, col. 5. By a vote of 11 to 1 the Louisville Board of Aldermen had resolved: "We, the Board of Alderman
of the City of Louisville, are opposed to any ordinance which takes
away the right of an owner of a private business to select his or its
customers or clientele." N.Y. Times, June 15, 1961, at 32, col. 7.
94 N.Y. Times, Dec. 13, 1966, at 26, col. 3.
95 N.Y. Times, Dec. 5, 1967, at 43, col. 4 (holding that a private club was
a place of public accommodation in Kansas). But see id., June 10, 1962,
at 81, col. 1 (holding that a golf club was exempt from the Colorado
law).
96 N.Y. Times, April 28, 1966, at 39, col. 2 (city ed.).
97 N.Y. Times, July 29, 1967, at 2, col. 8.
98 N.Y. Times, Aug. 17, 1963, at 7, col. 4.
99 N.Y. Times, Feb. 11, 1962, at 7, col. 1 (city ed.).
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Because discrimination in England against Negroes and Indians
in pubs and other places was widespread, 100 the Labor Party has
recently passed a law forbidding discrimination in "places of public
resort."' 0' The London pub owners' association urged a one-day
0 2
But
shutdown to protest denial of the right to choose customers.
a similar order in Zambia has backfired. There a white barber had
segregated his shop with a partition, with blacks paying 40 cents
while white customers paid a dollar. When the government ordered
the partition he complied; then he charged everyone
him to remove
103
a dollar.
II.

THE ERA OF SEPARATE AND EQUAL

A. Tim CoMMoN

LAW BACKGROUND

A common misconception which currently pervades legal literature is that the doctrine of "separate-but-equal" originated fullblown from the celebrated case of Plessy v. Ferguson.0 4 Nothing
could be further from the truth. In fact, this doctrine has had a long
common-law history.
In England, even those businesses which had to serve the public
without discrimination always had the right to arrange their customers as they choose. For example, an innkeeper had the right to
select the rooms for his guests; they could not choose their own
rooms. 0 5 The rule was the same in Canada. 0 6 The Scottish Court of
Session has held that a railway company has the right to assign
seats to passengers, and the fact that a passenger has taken a seat
before one is assigned to him does not prevent the company from
moving him to the assigned seat. 0 7 The rule appears to be similar
in Canada.108
The South African law is of particular interest because it has
proceeded in the exact opposite direction from American law.
Originally, complete freedom of choice was the rule in South
Africa. In 1910, it was held that a local authority had no legal
100

N.Y. Times, Nov. 18, 1965, at 33, col. 1.

102

N.Y. Times, May 26, 1965, at 3, col. 4 (city ed.).

103

N.Y. Times, March 2, 1967, at 4, col. 6;
163 U.S. 537 (1896).

101 N.Y. Times, May 4, 1965, at 1, col. 6.
104

id. March 19, 1967, at 17, col. 3.

Fell v. Knight, 8 M. & W. 269, 151 Eng. Rep. 1039 (1841); Scrivenor v.
Reed, 6 W.R. 603 (1858).
106 Doyle v. Walker, 26 U. Can. Q.B. 502 (C.A. 1867).
L07 Scott v. Great North of Scotland Ry. Co., 22 R. 287, 32 Scot. L.R. 218
(Ct. of Sess. 1895).
108 See O'Connor v. Halifax Tramway Co., 38 N.S.R. 212, 225 (1905), affd,
37 S.C.R. 523 (1905).

105

FREEDOM OF CHOICE IN ACCOMMODATION
right to segregate swimming areas by race. 10 9 It was also held
that a municipality had no right to require taxicabs to carry only
white or colored passengers, because the owner could choose his
own customers. 10 But as early as 1916, the Transvaal Provincial
Division held that a municipality could run tram lines for white
persons and exclude colored persons entirely if there was insufficient colored business. A dissenting justice argued that while a
municipality could segregate trams and run fewer colored trams if
demand was less, it could not refuse all service to colored passengers,
who could take white trams if none other were being
1
run."'

2
The landmark case of Rasool v. Minister of Posts & Telegraphs"
fixed the law on this point. Here, the Appellate Division of the
Supreme Court of South Africa decided that it was lawful to
segregate post office counters by race. One justice dissented on the
ground that racial segregation denoted inferiority, impaired the
dignity of the individual, and denied equality before the law."
The same rule was immediately applied to railways."14

Shortly thereafter, the South African Supreme Court established its own version of the "separate but equal" doctrine. In
one case, the Cape Provincial Division upheld segregated beaches
if facilities had been equal, but also held that a segregation regulation was invalid where the European section had good roads
and fine sand, while the non-European section had no roads and
was rocky.115 Likewise, in 1950 the Appellate Division decided that
absent express statutory authority, the right to segregate would not
be deemed to include the right to assign substantially unequal
facilities to different races. It therefore disapproved the majority
opinion and agreed with the dissenting justice in the Transvaal
Provincial Division case previously noted. 11 The court concluded
that a railway regulation reserving some coaches for Europeans
but not reserving any for non-Europeans exclusively was unequal
and invalid." 7 Three years later the court held that a native could
not be convicted for using a European railway waiting room when

109 Rex v. Plaatjes, So. Afr. L. Rep. 1910 E.D.L. 63.

110 Swarts v. Pretoria Municipality, So. Afr. L. Rep. 1920 T.P.D. 187.
"' George v. Pretoria Municipality, So. Afr. L. Rep. 1916 T.P.D. 501.
11 So. Afr. L. Rep. 1934 A.D. 167.
113 Id. at 183.
"14 Rex. v. Herman, So. Afr. L. Rep. 1937 A.D. 168. See also Rex v. Mozumba, 1953 (1) S.A.L.R. 235 (T.P.D.) (railway staircase segregated).
"15 Rex v. Carelse, So. Afr. L. Rep. 1943 C.P.D. 242.
116 George v. Pretoria Municipality So. Afr. L. Rep. 1916 T.P.D. 501.
117 Rex v. Abdurahman, 1950 (3) S.A.L.R. 136 (A.D.).
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the native waiting room had inferior accommodations. 118 It had
also been held that apartheid in buses is lawful, but cannot be
applied when it would cause large financial losses to the bus
company.119
But the inequality had to be substantial. Accordingly, it was held
that where Europeans on buses were allocated soft or padded seats
and non-Europeans obtained only hard seats, such a difference did
not invalidate the bus segregation. 120 Likewise, it was held that
where the non-European waiting room has inferior facilities because
elsewhere,
it is being used temporarily while rebuilding goes on
1 1
segregation cannot be voided for that reason alone.
Since 1960, apartheid has been given a dominant position. Thus,
the Appellate Division has held that the Group Areas Act authorizes
separate and unequal accommodations for the purpose of shifting
population.122 Of course, freedom of choice has given way to this
policy. It has thus been held that a taxi limited to conveying nonwhite passengers may be convicted for taking a white passenger. 12
This policy has not spread to Rhodesia, which still does not permit
municipal discrimination. 1'
In the United States, as early as 1858 the Illinois Supreme Court
held that a ferryman, who was a common carrier, had the absolute
right to decide what position each person should take on the boat,
without reference to priority of arrival at the ferry.1' The common law, as it developed in the nineteenth century, gave common
carriers and innkeepers, who had to accommodate all persons, the
right to engage in racial or other segregation. 12 6 Thus it was held
Rex v. Lusu, 1953 (2) S.A.L.R. 484 (A.D.). See also Rex v. Zihlangu,
1953 (3) S.A.L.R. 871 (C.P.D.).
119 Pietermaritzburg City Council v. Local Road Transportation Bd.,
1959 (2) S.A.L.R. 758 (N.P.D.), aff'd 1960 (1) S.A.L.R. 254 (N.P.D.).
120 Tewari v. Durban Corp., 1953 (1) S.A.L.R. 85 (N.P.D.).
121 Rex v. Lepile, 1953 (1) S.A.L.R. 225 (T.P.D.). See also Reddy v. Durban
Corp., 1954 (4) S.A.L.R. 304 (N.P.D.).
122 Minister of the Interior v. Lockhat, 1961 (2) S.A.L.R. 587 (A.D.).
12 S. v. Engeldoe's Taxi Service (Pty.) Ltd., 1966 (1) S.A.L.R. 329
(A.D.); S. v. Salama Taxis (Pty.) Ltd., 1964 (1) S.A.L.R. 371 (C.P.D.).
124 Chamboko v. Town Management Bd. of Mabelreign, 1962 Rhod. &
Nya. Rep. 450; Desai & Co. v. Bindura Town Management Bd., 1952
S. Rhod. 136, 1952 (3) S.A.L.R. 742, aff'd 1953 (1) S.A.L.R. 358 (A.D.).
125 Claypool v. McAllister, 20 Ill. 504 (1858).
126 See Avins, Racial Segregation in Public Accommodations: Some Re11S

flected Light on the Fourteenth Amendment from the Civil Rights
Act of 1875, 18 WEST. RES. L. REV. 1251, 1255, n. 19 (1967), and the

cases cited therein. See also Houck v. Southern Pac. Ry. Co., 38 Fed.
226 (C.C.W.D. Tex. 1888). In Henderson v. Trailway Bus. Co., 194 F.
Supp. 423, 426 (E.D. Va. 1961), the court said: "Racial segregation on
property in private demesne has never in law been condemnable.
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that a rule of a streetcar company separating the races was valid.1 27
Likewise, it has been held that a carrier may require a white deputy
sheriff handcuffed to a Negro prisoner to sit with the prisoner in
the colored car and not the white car. 12 Of course, the same rule
was applied to businesses without franchises, such as theaters. 29
The authorities pointed out that the "difference between discrimination and classificationis important, and there is no Tack of decisions which emphasize it."'' 30
Even the southern courts recognized that the common law
required carriers to offer equal facilities as the coroflary of racial
segregation. Thus, the Kentucky Court of Appeals declared:
No rule, regulation, custom, or usage may be relied upon by a
carrier which will permit it to discriminate against or in favor
of a passenger on account of his race or color. Such is intolerable
and will not be countenanced by the courts. She was entitled at
the hands of appellee, its agents and servants, to equal and like
accommodation in any and all respects to those accorded or given
to white persons ....
In the discharge of its duty as a public carrier,
a bus company must use their public conveyances and buses, owned
and set apart by it for that purpose, for the transportation of
passengers, without favor or discrimination, to all persons offering
Indeed, the occupant may lawfully forbid any and all persons, regardless of his reason or their race or religion, to enter or remain upon
any part of his premises which are not devoted to a public use."
127 Bowie v. Birmingham Ry. & El. Co., 125 Ala. 397, 27 So. 1016 (1900).
128 Spenny v. Mobile & 0. R. Co., 192 Ala. 483, 68 So. 870 (1915), denying
cert. to 12 Ala. App. 375, 67 So. 740 (Ct. App. 1914). In Huff v. Norfolk Southern R. Co., 171 N.C. 203, 207, 88 S.E. 344, 346 (1916), the
court declared: "Under his contract of carriage he was entitled to be
transported to his destination, and afforded sufficient and equal accommodation during his journey, but he had no right to roam at will over
the train or to take his seat with his handcuffed colored prisoner in
the car set apart for white persons, regardless of the comfort and
convenience of the other passengers, and contrary to the directions
of the conductor, given in the reasonable exercise of his authority."
129 In Younger v. Judah, 111 Mo. 303, 312, 19 S.W. 1109, 1111 (1892), the
court held: "Such separation does not necessarily assert or imply
inferiority on the part of one or the other ....
The colored man has,
and is entitled to have, all of the rights of a citizen, but it cannot be
said that equality of rights means identity in all respects."
180 Wister, Discrimination Not Between Sex But the Color of Citizens,
32 Am. L. REG. (n.e.) 748, 754 (1893). See also Chiles v. Chesapeake &
0. Ry.Co., 125 Ky. 299, 306, 101 S.W. 386, 388 (1907), aff'd 218 U.S. 71
(1910), where the Kentucky Court of Appeals declared: "There is a
wide difference between classification and regulation involving a separation of the races and a discrimination between them. When there are
two cars in a train, or two compartments in a car, substantially alike
in quality, convenience, and accommodation, neither white nor colored
passengers have the legal right to complain that they have been discriminated against merely because the carrier required each race to
occupy a car or compartment set aside for its accommodation."
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themselves for transportation .... It must receive, treat, and transport all persons, affording the same convenience, safety, and protection of health, without regard to race, creed, or color, or previous condition of servitude.... A common carrier of passengers
for hire has the right, in the absence of a statute, to prescribe regulations for the separation of white and colored passengers, giving
equal and like protection and accommodation to both.... We know
of no rule that requires a common carrier of passengers for hire to
yield to the disposition of passengers, arbitrarily to determine for
themselves as to the coach or vehicle in which they may take
passage. They are entitled to be transported within a reasonable
time without discrimination and without favoritism or partiality,
but are without right to select the coach or vehicle or the seat
thereon which they will occupy.131
At the very beginning of its existence, some years before Plessy,
the Interstate Commerce Commission considered and approved
the "separate-but-equal" doctrine. In Council v. Western & Atlantic
R.R. Co., 1' the Commission drew an analogy between the right of
railroads to set aside cars for ladies, and its right to segregate the
races. It pointed to school segregation and separate organizations to
illustrate public sentiment in favor of segregation, and concluded
that segregation was not per se an undue prejudice and an unjust
preference. But it held that a railroad could not relegate a Negro
to an inferior car if it charged him first-class fare.
Likewise, in Heard v. Georgia R.R. Co., 133 the Commission justi-

fied segregation when accommodations were equal.134 But it condemned segregation of Negroes who paid first-class fare into inferior cars. It ruled that where segregation was enforced "the cars for
the two colors should be equal in their comforts and accommoda131
132

Brumfield v. Consolidated Coach Corp., 240 Ky. 1, 18-20, 40 S.W.2d
356, 364-65 (1931).
1 I.C.C. 339 (1887).

133 1 I.C.C. 428 (1888).
134 Id. at 435, where it said: "Itby no means follows that separation into

cars of equal quality and where the same protection is accorded is
undue preference to one class of passengers or undue prejudice to the
other class. Circumstances and conditions may exist to justify such
separation, and it may be in the interest of both that it should be done.
"The same section applies the same principles to the transportation
of property as to persons, but no one would seriously insist that the
statute requires all property of the same kind or all kinds of property to be carried in the same car. If like property receives like transportation and at like rates, the carrier's duty in that regard is performed. The number of cars used for the purpose is immaterial
"Identity, then, in the sense that all must be admitted to the same
car and that under no circumstances separation can be made, is not
indispensable to give effect to the statute. Its fair meaning is complied
with when transportation and accommodations equal in all respects
and at like cost are furnished and the same protection enforced."
Accord, Chiles v. Chesapeake & Ohio R. Co., 218 U.S. 71 (1910).
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tions, and that colored travelers should have no occasion for contrasting unfavorably their mode of transportation with that of
white travelers in the same train, where both pay the same price
for carriage."'13 5
The "separate-but-equal" doctrine was an attempt to balance
the respective interests and desires of both Negroes and white persons. The Commission pointed out:
When it becomes an element in a judicial controversy, one color
or race has no exclusive right to recognition nor ground for special
favor over the other, but white and black alike are entitled to
fair and impartial consideration, and the principle of equality of
rights is to be applied with even-handed justice, but without unnecessary extension beyond its legitimate purview. It is not, therefore, with sole regard to the wishes or conceptions of ideal justice
of colored persons, nor only with deference to the prejudices or
abstract convictions of white persons, that a practical adjustment
is to be reached, but with enlightened regard to the best interests
and harmonious relations of both, constrained by long past events
for which none now living are responsible to make their habitations and support themselves as best they can under the same
government.13 6
The Supreme Court placed an important limitation on the "separate-but-equal" doctrine in 1914. It held that a carrier could not
refuse to provide equivalent facilities for Negroes merely because
the amount of colored business did not justify equal facilities. To
this extent, segregation had to give way to equal facilities. The
Court reasoned that the right of each person to equivalent comthe carrier and its
fort in traveling outweighed whatever 13interest
7
patrons had in segregating passengers.
B.

THE SEGREGATION STATUTES
Segregation statutes, with rare exceptions, did not come into
existence in respect to railroads and other businesses until the
135 Heard v. Georgia R. R. Co., 1 I.C.C. 428, 435 (1888).
136 Id. at 432.

137 McCabe v. Atchison, Topeka & S.F. Ry. Co., 235 U.S. 151, 161-62 (1914),
where the Court declared: "This argument with respect to volume
of traffic seems to us to be without merit. It makes the constitutional
right depend upon the number of persons who may be discriminated
against, whereas the essence of the constitutional right is that it is a
personal one. Whether or not particular facilities shall be provided
may doubtless be conditioned upon there being a reasonable demand
therefor; but, if facilities are provided, substantial equality of treatment of persons traveling under like conditions cannot be refused.
It is the individual who is entitled to the equal protection of the
laws, and if he is denied by a common carrier, acting in the matter
under the authority of a state law, a facility or convenience in the
course of his journey which, under substantially the same circumstances, is furnished to another traveler, he may properly complain
that his constitutional privilege has been invaded."
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populist movement in the Southern states during the early 1890's
displaced the landed aristocracy which traditionally dominated
state governments and brought into power representatives of the
poorer whites, who were most likely to have to associate with
Negroes. 138 The common-law rule that Negro passengers stand on
the same footing as other passengers, and must be given the class
of accommodations called for by their tickets, 139 but on the other
hand are not entitled to any special privileges, 140 was adhered to
by the southern courts in applying segregation laws. Thus, the
Georgia Supreme Court awarded substantial damages to a colored
passenger who was not protected from abuse by a railway on which
he was riding. 141 The Kentucky Court of Appeals declared that
"the law requires a common carrier to receive and transport passengers without discrimination and with impartiality."'. 42 The Mississippi Supreme Court has been emphatic on the need to supply
equal facilities to both races. 143 And while it has been held that
failure to accord Negroes equal train accommodations does not
give rise to an action for damages absent special damages,'4 it has
also been held that a railroad is indictable for providing inferior
cars for Negroes.

145

The same rule applied to municipal recreational facilities.
Because a state may only make reasonable classifications as to
138 For a general discussion, see Stephenson, Race Distinctions in American Law, 43 Am. L. REv. 547, 552-78, 734-58 (1909); Stephenson, Sepa-

ration of the Races in Public Conveyances, 3 Am. POL. Sci. REV. 180
(1909); Dixon, Civil Rights in Transportation and the ICC, 31 GEo.
WAsH. L. REv. 198 (1962); Quindry, Airline Passenger Discrimination,
3 J. Ain LAW 479, 499-514 (1932).
139 Billinger v. Clyde S.S. Co., 158 Fed. 511 (S.D.N.Y. 1908).
140 Miller v. New Jersey Steamboat Co., 58 Hun 424, 12 N.Y.S. 301 (1890).
141 Richmond & D.R. Co. v. Jefferson, 89 Ga. 554, 16 S.E. 69 (1892).
142 Brumfield v. Consolidated Coach Corp., 240 Ky. 1, 14, 40 S.W.2d 356,
363 (1931).
143 Illinois Cent. R. Co. v. Redmond, 119 IVIiss. 765, 782, 81 So. 115, 117

(1919), where the court said: "The separate coach laws here under
consideration do not require that the accommodations furnished to
passengers of the one race be identical with those furnished to passengers of the other, but they do require in plain and unambiguous
language that the accommodations (which, of course, include not only
those things which are necessary for, but also such as add to comfort
and convenience) provided for passengers of the one race shall be
equal to those provided for passengers of the other race, from which
it necessarily follows that, if separate toilets are provided for the

sexes of the one race, separate toilets must also be provided for the
sexes of the other, and if a place in which to smoke is provided for

the one race, such a place must also be provided for the other."

144 Norwood v. Galveston, H. & S. A.R. Co., 12 Tex. Civ. App. 560, 34 S.W.
'45

180 (1896).
Louisville & N.R. Co. v. Commonwealth, 117 Ky. 345, 78 S.W. 167
(1904).
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who may use its recreational facilities,'146 it had been held that
147
Negroes were entitled to the equal use of tax-supported activities.
48
Accordingly, although segregation was upheld in parks,
playgrounds, 49 and other recreational areas, 50 it was also held that
Negroes could not be excluded entirely from publicly supported
golf courses, 51 libraries, 152 or swimming pools. 1' Where facilities
for Negroes were clearly inferior, the municipality could not confine
them to using them. 54
The courts also held that substantially equal facilities satisfied
the rule; they did not have to be identical.155 One court noted: "The
requirements of equality of treatment may be refined too far."'58
Thus, it was decided that a bus company rule seating Negro passengers from the rear forward and white passengers from the front
back was not discriminatory in spite of minor seating differences
if the seats were substantially equal. Moreover, reasonable shifting
of Negro passengers at normal discharge places such as stop-overs
was deemed valid, but a rule requiring repeated shifting of Negro
D.D.B. Realty Corp. v. Merrill, 232 F. Supp. 629 (D. Vt.1964).
Easterly v. Dempster, 112 F. Supp. 214 (E.D. Tenn. 1953).
148 Sweeney v. City of Louisville, 309 Ky. 465, 218 S.W.2d 30 (1949);
Berry v. City of Durham, 186 N.C. 421, 119 S.E. 748 (1923).
146

147

149 Camp v. Recreation Bd., 104 F. Supp. 10 (D.D.C. 1952).
150 Hayes v. Crutcher, 108 F. Supp. 582 (M.D. Tenn.1952).
51 Beal v. Holcombe, 193 F.2d 384 (5th Cir. 1951), cert. denied, 347 U.S. 974
(1954). Accord, City of Greensboro v. Simkins, 246 F.2d 425 (4th Cir.
1957).
152 Kerr v. Enoch Pratt Free Library, 149 F.2d 212 (4th Cir. 1945), cert.
denied, 326 U.S. 721 (1945).
153 Kern v. City Comm'rs, 151 Kan. 565, 100 P.2d 709 (1940).
'54 Williams v. Kansas City, 104 F. Supp. 848 (W.D. Mo. 1952), aff'd, 205
F.2d 47 (8th Cir. 1953), cert. denied, 346 U.S. 826 (1953).
155 Rogers v. Atchison, T. & S. F. Ry. Co., 283 S.W. 2d 664 (Mo. App.
1955). In Louisville & N.R. Co. v. Commonwealth, 160 Ky. 769, 774,
170 S.W. 162, 164 (1914), the court observed: "Equality of accommodations does not mean identity of accommodations ....To hold that it
does involves a considerable measure of refinement. If equality does
mean identity, then if the upholstering of the seats in that part of the
train set apart for white passengers is of plush, it cannot be leather in
that part set apart for colored passengers. And if the plush be red in the
one portion of the train, it must not be green in the other. If equality
of accommodations means identity, then if there are seats for 200
white passengers, there must likewise be provided seats for 200 colored
passengers. If equality means identity, then if there are 500 electric
lights in that portion of the train reserved for white passengers there
must be 500 electric lights in that part reserved for colored passengers."
156 Durkee v. Murphy, 181 Md. 259, 29 A.2d 253, 255 (1942). In Choctaw,
0. & G.R. Co. v. State, 75 Ark. 279, 282, 87 S.W. 426, 427 (1905), the
court said: "The accommodations need not be the same; if as good,
they would be equal, within the meaning and spirit of the statute;
its object being to prevent discrimination.... The waiting rooms need
not be of the same dimensions."
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passengers was deemed discriminatory. 157 Likewise, it was held that
where Negro passenger traffic constituted only ten to fifteen percent
of the total, a pro rata facility was satisfactory. 15s
Sometimes, however, separate and equal became mutually exclusive categories by force of circumstances. Cases occurred where
colored passengers had to stand because empty seats in the white
section were not allocated to them. 59 Even before 1954, the federal
courts were able to alleviate this problem in respect to interstate
carriers. Thus, the Seventh Circuit held that requiring a Negro bus
passenger to stand when there were seats in the white portion of
the bus, and refusing to move a partition forward when the Negro
section was crowded and the white section had vacancies, constituted an undue discrimination in violation of the Interstate Commerce Act.6 0 Likewise the Fourth Circuit decided that a railroad
regulation forcing passengers to change cars at particular points to
segregate interstate passengers, unduly burdened interstate commerce in violation of the Interstate Commerce Act.' 6 '
In intrastate commerce, the state courts made the final decision
as to whether separate or equal was to be the dominant consideration. In one case where a Negro woman boarded a city bus and
took the only vacant seat in the white section, the Supreme Court
of Appeals of Virginia held that the act of the bus driver in directing her to go to the colored section in the rear, but not directing
a white person to exchange seats with her, was an invalid attempt
Day v. Atlantic Greyhound Corp., 171 F.2d 59 (4th Cir. 1948). In
New v.Atlantic Greyhound Corp., 186 Va. 726, 744, 43 S.E.2d 872, 881
(1947), the court said: "Segregation statutes must be enforced equally
and without discrimination in the quality and convenience of accommodations provided for white and colored passengers.... The colored
passenger is entitled to every substantial accommodation offered a
white passenger. There must be 'substantial equality of treatment' as
well as 'substantial equality of facilities' furnished. There must be
no discrimination in terms or enforcement....
"It is impossible for the accommodations on a bus to be absolutely
identical in all respects ....
There must be some seats in the front of a
vehicle and some in the rear, as well as in the middle. Some must
be over the wheels, or, perhaps over the engine, if the engine is under
the body. All window arrangements are not the same. A minor or
trifling inconvenience or difference in seating is inevitable under the
most favorable conditions, and minor disadvantages in travel do not
necessarily indicate discrimination."
158 Louisville & N.R. Co. v. Commonwealth, 160 Ky. 769, 774, 170 S.W.
162, 164 (1914).
159 See, e.g., Illinois Cent. R. Co. v. Redmond, 119 Miss. 765, 81 So. 115
(1919).
160 Lyons v. Illinois Greyhound Lines, 192 F.2d 533 (7th Cir. 1951).
161 Chance v. Lambeth, 186 F.2d 899 (4th Cir. 1951), cert. denied sub nom.
Atlantic Coast Line R. Co. v. Chance, 341 U.S. 941 (1951).
17
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to enforce the segregation statute in a discriminatory manner."0 2
But that same court also held that where the 1ast remaining seat
on a bus with sets of double seats is next to one occupied by a white
person, and all of the seats in the Negro section are filled, a Negro
must stand rather than sit down. The majority of the court held
that when seats are fairly allotted to each race in accordance with
their expected use of the facility, there is no discrimination even if
more members of one race use it than expected. In such a case,
"one has to stand and thus to undergo a minor inconvenience.'163
A dissenting justice argued that the Negro standee was discriminated against in the "quality or convenience of the accommodations"
afforded to him, and that it was no excuse that Negroes as a whole
were as well treated as white persons as a whole since the right
to equal treatment was individual and not collective. This justice
noted that if the standee had been white he could have sat down.
He concluded:
The 'quality and convenience of accommodation' provided by the
carrier bear no relation to the color or race of its passengers. Passengers on the same vehicle paying the same rate of fare are
entitled to receive 'substantial equality of facilities.'
Seats are provided because of the desirability for comfort, convenience and safety. A standing position in the aisle of a bus, subject
to its starting, moving and stopping movements can hardly be said
to be substantially equal164in convenience and accommodation to
the occupancy of a seat.
The justification for segregation in public carriers was long ac162 Davis v. Commonwealth, 182 Va. 760, 765, 30 S.E.2d 700, 703 (1944),
where the court remarked: "A statute which permits inequality of
treatment to the members of the two races would be plainly invalid."
163 Commonwealth v. Carolina Coach Co., 192 Va. 745, 754, 66 S.E. 2d
572, 578 (1951). The court also said: "There is not and cannot be any
fundamental or legal difference in segregation by seats on a bus and
segregation by coaches or compartments on a train. For we know
that factually and in reality all seats in a coach or in a partitioned
part of a coach assigned to one race must, in the nature of things,
be at times occupied and no seat available to a passenger of that race
when there are unoccupied seats in the other coach or partitioned
space allotted the other race. The physical difference, such as it is,
in the two methods or modes of segregation is that segregation by
seats affords a more equitable allotment of space and conveniences
than does separation by coaches or by partitions in coaches.
"By this legislation, no paramount rights or privileges are given
to one race over the other or to one individual over another. It is
not due to any discrimination, but to circumstances, applying alike
to all-as well to a white citizen as to a colored one, that a member of
one race or the other may under some conditions find no seating
accommodation available."
164 Id. at 759, 66 S.E.2d at 580.
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cepted, not only by the courts, 165 but also by writers in legal periodicals. 16 6 One writer for the Yale Law Journal urged a federal segregation statute based on alleged scientific evidence of racial antipathy. 167 The generally accepted view was that segregation was
an exercise of the police power to prevent collisions and disorder
which integration might cause. 168 The Supreme Court of Mississippi
even suggested that Negroes wanted railroad segregation as much
as white people, in order to avoid race riots.169
A more realistic view of the matter was taken by those cases
which frankly ascribed segregation statutes to the desire of many
white people not to sit next to Negroes. 70 In Spenny v. Mobile &
165

166
167

168

169

Corporation Commission v. Transportation Committee, 198 N.C. 317,
151 S.E. 648 (1930). See also the lengthy opinion of Mr. Justice Clifford
endorsing segregation in carriers in Hall v. DeCuir, 95 U.S. 485, 500-09
(1878).
Doolan, Validity of Separate Coach Laws When Applied to Interstate
Passengers,1 VA. L. REv. 379 (1914).
Baker, Segregation of White and Colored Passengers on Interstate
Trains, 19 YALE L.J. 445 (1909). The author said: "A Federal statute
is necessary to compel interstate carriers to separate colored and white
passengers, and if such legislation could be accomplished the separation of the races in transportation would be a worthy regulation of
commerce." Id. at 451-52.
In Smith v. State, 100 Tenn. 494, 500, 46 S.W. 566, 568 (1898), the
court declared: "A requirement that all persons who travel shall
travel together is not in any sense a police regulation. It is easy to
perceive how it might conduce to the comfort, health, or safety of
persons traveling to be separated, but no reason of this kind can be
found, nor any other of a police nature, for requiring that all should
be crowded or mixed together...."
In Alabama & V. Ry. Co. v. Morris, 103 Miss. 511, 518-19, 60 So. 11,
13-14 (1912), the court asserted: "The statute was not enacted with
any idea of discriminating against the members of either race; nor
was it prompted by prejudice or passion, but with the knowledge
that the enforced intermingling of the races would be distasteful to
both races, would inevitably result in discomfort to both, and provoke and encourage conflicts endangering the peace and quiet of
the commonwealth....
"The two races here accept the law as a wise and necessary exercise of the police power of the state for the protection of members of
both races. No greater punishment could be inflicted upon the average
negro traveler than being obliged to sit in the coach set apart for
whites, and our colored fellow citizens would be the first to oppose a

repeal of the statute.
"A riot upon an interstate train growing out of the refusal of
common carriers to recognize a situation known to every Mississippian
-black and white-would endanger the lives and disturb the peace
of all persons passengers on the train, .... the law is... a reasonable
170

and wise exercise of the police power of the state."
See e.g., Ohio Val. Ry.'s Receiver v. Lander, 104 Ky. 431, 47 S.W. 344,
(1898), rehearing denied, 104 Ky. 431, 48 S.W. 145 (1898).
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O.R. Co.,1'71 Thomas, J., in a dissenting opinion, argued that if this
purpose was ascribed to the legislature, the statute would have to
be declared in violation of the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment. He asserted that the only legitimate purpose
which the statute could have would be the preservation of the
public peace. 7 2 However, the majority took the position that as long
as equal facilities were in fact afforded to Negro passengers, it was
immaterial that the motive of the legislature was to protect white
persons who did not want to associate with Negroes, and not to
protect Negroes who were adverse to associating with white
persons.178
171

12 Ala. App. 375, 67 So. 740 (Ct. App. 1914), cert. denied, 192 Ala.
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He declared: "'While the statute, in terms, equally protects whites

483, 68 So. 870 (1915).

from the presence of negroes, and negroes from the presence of whites
in their respective coaches, yet it is well known that the leading purpose of this statute was to protect the white race from the presence

of negroes while traveling on trains.'... if, as was done by the Texas

court [in Gulf, C. & S.F. Ry. Co. v. Sharman, 158 S.W. 1045, 1047 (Tex.
Civ. App. 1913) ] we hold that the 'leading purpose of this statute was
to protect the white race from the presence of negroes while riding
on trains,' it will result in the condemnation of the statute in toto as
being in the teeth of the Fourteenth amendment to the Federal Con-

stitution, designed, as it was, to prevent discriminations between races

173

in state laws and guaranteeing to each and all 'equal protection of
the laws.'
"The only basis upon which statutes like the one here have been
sustained by the United States Supreme Court as not being in conffict with the said Fourteenth amendment to the United States Constitution... is that such statutes afford equal accommodations for
and like protection to each race and were designed as police regulations to prevent breaches of the peace. Whatever private or secret
reasons may have actuated the Legislature in the passage of the
statute, if any, are not to be considered in construing the statute. We
are not permitted to ascribe to them, as did the Texas court, unconstitutional purposes not disclosed in the act; but, the act being consistent
in its terms, with constitutional purposes, we shall presume that these
and these only led to its passage, which was a desire, as we have
before said, to promote the public peace by preventing clashes and
conflicts between the two races, which would result if it was permitted
that they be brought together as fellow travelers in the same railroad
car or compartment, and with equal rights therein as such, both as to
the matter of sitting and as to all other privileges of passengers." Id. at
386-88, 67 So. at 743-44.
The court said: "It does not seem to me that enactments of the nature
under consideration would be affected and held to be void as violating
the provisions of the fourteenth amendment of the federal Constitution, guaranteeing to all persons equal protection of the laws, because
we are aware of the history and cause for their enactment as a matter
of common knowledge, and use this knowledge in applying them to
concrete cases.., so long as no discrimination is made in the enforcement of the statutes, and equal protection of the law is accorded to
all. It has been held to be a reasonable regulation for a carrier to
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C. CRITICISMS OF ENFORCED SEGREGATION

The enforcement of segregation laws in carriers led to a situation which many people considered a burdensome nuisance, causing more discomfort and inconvenience than the contrary. For
example, under state segregation laws it was held that railroads
had to provide a separate coach for each race even though there
were no Negro passengers since Negroes could demand passage
at any time. 7 4 It was decided that a Negro porter could be in a
white Pullman car to perform duties but not to sleep there. 7 5
Another case ruled that even where separate toilets were not provided for the sexes, they would have to be provided for different
races. 78 The Tennessee Supreme Court said that separate dining
car accommodations might be made in compliance with the statute
by calling white railroad passengers first and Negroes next, but it
awarded damages for negligence to white passengers who were
called when Negroes were also being served. 177

174

175
176
177

have on its train a coach to be occupied exclusively by ladies.... It
was not to keep ladies out of other cars, but to prevent men from
obtruding on ladies.... We also know as a matter of common knowledge that the object and purpose... in passing the statutes for the
segregation of the races in jails and schools and on the trains and
other places, was not to prevent an undesirable and unwelcome intrusion of the white people upon the colored people; ... are we to be
required to throw away common knowledge and common sense and
blind ourselves to the universal knowledge that they were enacted
by a dominant white race with a view to the preservation of peace
and good order and the promotion of that race's quiet enjoyment of
these places without the association of the negro race, and to prevent
the evil and disturbances that are likely to result as the consequences
of an undesired intrusion by negroes upon white persons in those
places where a comingling of the races is provided against? ...[We]
historically know that the enactment of these laws grew out of no
purpose to meet an objection of the negro race against association
with the white race, nor to prevent the white people from attending
Negro schools, or riding in cars, or compartments of cars, set apart
for Negroes.... If it should be a fact that the Negro race claims no
right as against the intrusion upon it of the white race, how can it
then be said to be a denial of any right, equal or otherwise, of that
race for a white person to occupy a compartment on a car set apart for
the occupancy of the Negro race?" Id. at 399-401, 67 So. at 747-48.
Louisville, & N.R. Co. v. Commonwealth, 171 Ky. 355, 188 S.W. 394
(1916). In Southern Kansas Ry. Co. v. State, 44 Tex. Civ. App. 218,
99 S.W. 166 (1906), the court said of such a situation: "Neither would
a press of business excuse the railroad company from a compliance
with the terms of the statute, since, if it chooses to do business in
this state, it must do so according to the regulations of the law."
Ammons v. Murphree, 191 Miss. 238, 2 So. 2d 555 (1941).
Louisville & N.R. Co. v. Commonwealth, 160 Ky. 769, 170 S.W. 162
(1914).
Shelton v. Chicago, R.I. & P.R. Co., 139 Tenn. 378, 201 S.W. 521 (1917).
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It was these burdensome adjustments, and the occasional necessity of denying substantially equal treatment to Negro passengers
in order to comply with state segregation laws without unreasonable financial expense, that led the Supreme Court prior to 1954
to forbid compliance with such laws in interstate transportation.
In Mitchell v. United States,1 78 the Court decided that a carrier
cannot refuse to accord identical accommodations to Negroes who
pay the same fare even if desegregation must thereby occur. The
Court in effect ruled that equal treatment was a more important
value than the associational preferences of white passengers. 17 9
Insofar as this relates to facilities only, it is difficult to quarrel with
such a value judgment.
In Morgan v. Virginia,80 the Court decided that segregation
statutes were invalid as applied to interstate buses since they compelled passengers to move back and forth to comply with them.
Thus the enforcement of these statutes constituted a burden on
178
179

313 U.S.80 (1941).
The Court said: "The Government puts the matter succinctly: 'When
a drawing room is available, the carrier practice of allowing colored
passengers to use one at Pullman seat rates avoids inequality as
between the accommodations specifically assigned to the passenger.
But when none is available, as on the trip which occasioned this litigation, the discrimination and inequality of accommodation become
self-evident. It is no answer to say that the colored passengers, if
sufficiently diligent and forehanded, can make their reservations so
far in advance as to be assured of first-class accommodations. So long
as white passengers can secure first-class reservations on the day of
travel and the colored passengers cannot, the latter are subjected
to inequality and discrimination because of their race'. And the Commission has recognized that inequality persists with respect to certain
other facilities such as dining-car and observation-parlor car accommodations.
"We take it that the chief reason for the Commission's action was
the 'comparatively little colored traffic'. But the comparative volume
of traffic cannot justify the denial of a fundamental right of equality
of treatment, a right specifically safeguarded by the provisions of the
Interstate Commerce Act. We thought a similar argument with respect
to volume of traffic to be untenable in the application of the Fourteenth
Amendment. We said that it made the constitutional right depend
upon the number of persons who may be discriminated against,
whereas the essence of that right is that it is a personal one....
While
the supply of particular facilities may be conditioned upon there being
a reasonable demand therefor, if facilities are provided, substantial
equality of treatment of persons traveling under like conditions cannot be refused. It is the individual, we said, who is entitled to the
equal protection of the laws,--not merely a group of individuals, or
a body of persons according to their numbers ....
And the Interstate
Commerce Act expressly extends its prohibitions to the subjecting of
'any particular person' to unreasonable discriminations." Id. at 96-97.

180 328 U.S. 373 (1946).
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interstate commerce. However, Mr. Justice Reed also remarked
that such statutes restrict "freedom of choice in selecting accommodations."'' Insofar as the selection does not infringe on the associational preferences of other passengers, this conclusion, too, cannot be faulted.
The final blow came in Henderson v. Interstate Commerce
Commission.182 In this case, the district court had under consideration railroad dining car segregation. It held that the railroad could
not lawfully set aside tables for white persons without setting aside
some tables for Negroes. It therefore ruled that a system whereby
Negroes could only be served if no white passengers were occupying seats conditionally reserved for Negroes, but that white passengers could always be served in the white section, was unlawful
discrimination against Negroes. The district court decided that if
white passengers could sit in unoccupied Negro seats, Negroes ought
to be entitled to sit in unoccupied white seats. It added that service
at the passenger's seat was not an equal substitute to service in
the dining car.5 3
However, the district court went on to hold that where certain
tables were reserved for white passengers and one table, separated
by a partition, was reserved exclusively for colored passengers,
there was equality of treatment. Moreover, where experience
showed that about four percent of the meals were served to Negroes,
reserving one table out of eleven, or eight percent of the seating,
for Negroes, was held to be fair and non-discriminatory. The court
said that if more than four Negroes wanted to eat at one time, the
ones waiting would be in no different a position than white persons
who arrived when the white section was overcrowded.
A dissenting judge, however, took the position that the railroad
could not refuse to serve anybody if there were any empty seats
in either section.184 In reversing the district court, the Supreme
181 Id. at 383.

80 F. Supp. 32 (D. Md. 1948), rev'd. 339 U.S. 816 (1950).
Id. at 34-35, where the court declared: "The alternative offered the
Negro passenger of being served at his seat in the coach or in the
Pullman car without extra charge does not in our view afford service
substantially equivalent to that furnished in a dining car. True, some
passengers may prefer not to patronize a diner, and we will assume
that the menu is the same and the service scarcely, if at all, less
expeditious when meals are served in coaches or Pullman cars. Nevertheless, the Negro passenger is entitled to dine with friends if he
sees fit to do so, and should not be unnecessarily subjected to the
inconvenience of dining alone under the crowded conditions which
service, especially in a coach or in a sleeper, may entail."
184 Id. at 40, where he declared: "This arrangement on its face seems
fair to the Negro race, but it is based on the erroneous assumption that

182

188
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Court agreed with the dissenting view. That Court remarked: "That
the regulations may impose on white passengers, in proportion to
their numbers, disadvantages similar to those imposed on Negro
passengers is not an answer...."-185
Another criticism of segregation laws was that they violated
freedom of choice in association by keeping people apart who
wanted to associate with each other. 18 6 For example, the Kentucky
laws were "intended to force the separation of white and colored
people while traveling upon railroads in this state."'.87 The Fifth
Circuit recently recognized the fact that the state has no legitimate
interest in separating people who want to ride together, talk with
each other, or use some private facility in common. It held that
white persons were entitled to eat with Negroes in restaurants
free from state-imposed segregation, pointing to "the freedom of
a white man peacefully to associate with Negroes in a public restaurant free from the actual or threatened arrest by police officers
as a means of enforcing segregation."'.88
In one pre-1954 case, it was held that segregated public recreational facilities are constitutional even though both whites and
Negroes complained that they wanted to play sports together.
The court said:
the rights which the Fourteenth Amendment is designed to protect
are racial rather than personal in their nature. The regulations set
aside one table in the dining car exclusively for Negroes and ten
tables exclusively for whites, and the result is that occasionally a
member of one race is denied service which is then available to a
member of the other. Whenever this occurs, the Railroad Company
discriminates against one passenger in favor of another because of
his race, and deprives him of equality of treatment, and it is no
answer to say that the Railroad Company has taken reasonable precautions to prevent the occurrence. It is true that segregation of the
races is lawful provided 'substantial equality of treatment of persons
traveling under like conditions' is accorded; but the right belongs
to the individual and not to the race, and segregation must be abandoned, or at least temporarily suspended, whenever its enforcement
deprives the individual of treatment equal to that accorded to any
other person at the same time.
"Segregation in railroad traffic may be maintained if there are
sufficient accommodations for all; but a vacant seat may not be
denied to a passenger simply because of his race."

185 339 U.S. at 825.

186 See Taylor v. Leonard, 30 N.J. Super. 116, 119-20, 103 A.2d 632, 633-34
(1954): "The evil of a quota system is that it assumes that Negroes are
different from other citizens and should be treated differently ... It

makes no difference that equal facilities are provided to Negroes.
Segregation necessarily implies that Negroes must be kept separate
and apart from all other people. Like the quota system it is premised
on the concept that Negroes are different."
187 Commonwealth v. Louisville & N.R. Co., 120 Ky. 91, 87 S.W. 262 (1905).
188 Nesmith v. Alford, 318 F.2d 110, 124-25 (5th Cir. 1963).
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It is suggested by counsel for the plaintiffs that this case differs
from the typical situation in which one or more Negroes alone are
seeking to enforce equality of treatment, because here they are
joined by some whites who insist upon the right to participate in
inter-racial sports. In my opinion the attempted distinction is
unsound. If the Board's requirement as to segregation was valid, it
was equally binding upon whites and Negroes. Their mutual desire
to participate together in athletic activities might be a proper
consideration for the Board in formulating its policy but cannot
of itself affect the power to make the regulation. 8 9

But the most serious objection to segregation laws in respect to
private business is that it constitutes a usurpation by the state of
the discretion of the business proprietor. For example, it has been
held that an ordinance requiring segregation in bars is unconstitutional. 190 Likewise, it has been held that an ordinance requiring
taxicabs to be registered as either colored or white, and to take
only passengers as registered, is unconstitutional. 191
In McCain v. Davis,192 a majority of the court held that a law
forbidding white hotels from accommodating Negroes violated the
rights of Negroes under the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. However, in a special concurrence, Judge West
declared that the only question presented was whether the state
had the right to force a private hotel owner to refuse accommodations to a Negro when there were some white guests in the hotel.
He said that the right of Negroes to be accommodated was not in
issue since even if the statute were invalidated, hotel owners could
still refuse to accept them. Therefore, he said that "the only right
involved is the right of the hotel owner to conduct his business
without undue government interference, rather than the right of
the Negro to be admitted to the hotels in question.' 9 3
As for the constitutionality of the statute, Judge West rightly
declared:
189 Boyer v. Garrett, 88 F. Supp. 353, 359 (D. Md. 1949), aff'd, 183 F.2d
582 (4th Cir. 1950), cert. denied, 340 U.S. 912 (1951).

190 Robertson v. Johnston, 376 F.2d 43 (5th Cir. 1967); Pania v. City of

New Orleans, 262 F.Supp. 651 (E.D.La. 1967); De Angelis v. Board of
Liquor License Commrs., 1 RACE REL. L. Rep. 370 (Balt. City Ct.,
Md. 1955).
19' Bergerson v. City of New Orleans, 11 RACE REL. L. REP. 945 (U.S.D.C.,
E.D. La. 1965). The court here also held that if a taxicab was considered a public utility, and it could not have refused to take any
passenger of the race for which it was registered, under this ruling
it now could not refuse to take any passenger.
192 217 F. Supp. 661 (E.D. La. 1963).
193 Id. at 669. He added: "[T]o hold that this statute forbidding the operator of a so-called white hotel to rent to a Negro is unconstitutional
should in no way be construed to mean that such a hotel operator
is required to rent a room to a Negro."
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Just as I believe that the federal government may not legally
force the owner or operator of a private business to integrate, so
do I believe that the state or local government may not compel
the owner or operator of a private business to segregate. Such
continued and extended interference by state and federal government into the operations of purely private business will surely spell
doom to our long cherished system of free enterprise. In our zeal
to protect the fundamental rights of minority groups, let us not
forget that a hotel owner, just as the owner of any other private
business enterprise, also has certain constitutionally guaranteed
rights. One of these rights is the right to own and operate his business without undue interference by either the state or national
government. Where, such as in the case of hotels, the business is
not a state or federally franchised, monopolistic enterprise, the
right of freedom to choose those with whom the owner or operator
wishes to do business is just as fundamental as any of the so-called
civil rights of which we lately hear so much.194

III. COMPULSORY INTEGRATION IN PRIVATE BUSINESS
When the rule of the school segregation decisions 95 was applied
to hold segregation laws unconstitutional in transportation 96 and

in entertainment, 9 7 business owners were freed from the restric-

tions of these governmental regulations and were free to follow
their own policies. Most businesses in the South would probably

have continued segregation in response to the wishes of their cus-

tomers. 1 8 In other words, the demise of these statutes simply
restored the original common law.
194 Id. at 669. He also said: "As far as I am concerned, this decision merely
gives greater latitude to a hotel operator and other persons covered
under the statute in question in the management of their business. It
does not substitute a mandate requiring him to integrate his hotel
for a prior mandate requiring him to segregate it. It eliminates both
mandates. It permits him to operate his own private business without
unwarranted governmental interference.
"The right of a person to operate his privately owned business
as he sees fit is just as sacred a right as any other civil right. I am
not willing to assist in driving the final nail in the coffin of free
enterprise." Id. at 670-71.
195 Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
196 Bailey v. Patterson, 369 U.S. 31 (1962); Bailey v. Patterson, 323 F.2d
201 (5th Cir. 1963); United States v. City of Jackson, 318 F.2d 1 (5th
Cir. 1963); Christian v. Jemison, 303 F.2d 52 (5th Cir. 1962); Fleming
v. South Carolina Elec. & Gas Co., 239 F.2d 277 (4th Cir. 1956), 224
F.2d 752 (4th Cir. 1955), appeal dismissed, 351 U.S. 901 (1956); Taylor
v. City Council of Augusta, 7 RAcE REL. L. REP. 227 (U.S.D.C., S.D.
Ga. 1962).
197 Due v. Tallahassee Theatres, Inc., 333 F.2d 630 (5th Cir. 1964).
198 See Bullock v. Tamiami Trail Tours, 266 F.2d 326 (5th Cir. 1959),
taking judicial notice of southern customs of segregated seating. In
Baldwin v. Morgan, 287 F.2d 750, 760 (5th Cir. 1961), the court observed: "While no law, or custom or usage which is the equivalent
of law, may compel the segregation of races in the area of public
transportation, it is equally clear that people of good will of both
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Moreover, there had been no change in the common law while
the segregation statutes were in effect; this law was merely suspended for the time being. Under these common law rules, a theater
owner had the right to seat different classes or races wherever
he chose. 199 The proprietor also had the right to segregate customers in hotels, 200 carriers, 20 1 and restaurants. 20

2

As one court ob-

served: "The owner-operator's refusal to serve defendants, except in
building designated by him, impaired no rights
the portion of the
203
of defendants."
It is interesting to note that several of the earlier cases held
that anti-discrimination laws did not require desegregation of facilities.20 4 For example, the Pennsylvania Superior Court held that
races are free to observe traditions which for generations have been
an intimate part of their way of life."
199 State v. Cobb, 262 N.C. 262, 136 S.E.2d 674 (1964); Taylor v. Cohn,
47 Ore. 538, 84 P. 388 (1906); De La Ysla v. Publix Theatres Corp.,
82 Utah 598, 26 P.2d 818 (1933). For the Canadian view, see Loew's
Montreal Theatres, Ltd. v. Reynolds, 30 Que. K.B. 459 (1919). For a
good general review of the subject, see Turner & Kennedy, Exclusion,
Ejection, and Segregation of Theater Patrons, 32 IowA L. REV. 625
(1947).
200 De Wolf v. Ford, 193 N.Y. 397, 401, 86 N.E. 527, 529 (1908): "And
while he is bound to accept as guests all proper persons, so long as
he has room for them, he is under no legal obligation to assign a
guest to any particular apartment."
201 See Simmons v. Atlantic Greyhound Corp., 75 F.Supp. 166, 176 (W.D.
Va. 1947): "No matter how much we may deplore it, the fact remains
that racial prejudices and antagonisms do exist and that they are
the source of many unhappy episodes of violence between members of
the white and colored races. If it is the purpose of the defendant
here to lessen the occasions for such conflicts by adoption of a rule
for the separate seating of white and colored passengers, this court
cannot say that such a rule is purely arbitrary and without reasonable
basis."
202 Nash v. Air Terminal Services, 85 F.Supp. 545 (E.D. Va. 1949).
203 State v. Clyburn, 247 N.C. 455, 460, 101 S.E.2d 295, 299 (1958).
204 See Redding v. South Carolina R. Co., 5 S.C. 67 (1873). In People v.
School Bd., 161 N.Y. 598, 601, 56 N.E. 81, 82 (1900), the court interpreted the New York Civil Rights Law as prohibiting only denial of
facilities, but not segregation, saying: "It was the facilities for and
the advantages of an education that it was required to furnish to all
the children, and not that it should provide for them any particular
class of associates while such education was being obtained." See also
Comment, Race Equality by Statute, 84 U. PA. L. REV. 75, 82-83 (1935):
"An important practical matter concerns the legality of providing
separate, but equal, accommodations in theatres and the like.... The
theory appears to be that having a portion of the theatre open to
whites and not to Negroes, constitutes discrimination. This may be
true if the whites are allowed seats in any portion of the theatre, but
it is open to serious question in case Negroes have a section from
which whites are excluded and which is fully as adequate as other
sections. In such a case both races are treated equally."
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theater segregation does not violate the state civil rights act.20 5
It was also held that restaurant segregation was not unlawful under
the statute. One court declared "that refusal to serve in one room
0
6
does not necessarily mean refusal to accommodate ....,2
However, the majority of cases hold that anti-discrimination
statutes have the effect of prohibiting segregation as well. Some of
them can be explained on the ground that the facilities offered the
Negro were not only separate but also inferior, such as letting a
Negro who comes into a restaurant only eat in the kitchen 20 7 or
not allowing Negroes to sit on the first floor of a theater. 20 8 It has
also been held that if a theater sells a ticket to a Negro, it cannot
refuse to allow him to occupy the seat he has purchased because
205

206

207

208

Commonwealth v. George, 61 Pa. Super. Ct. 412, 421 (1915), where the
court said: "Remembering that the Supreme Court of the United
States has held that civil rights do not mean the same or identical
rights, and that our own Supreme Court has held that the owner of
a theatre is a private citizen engaged in a strictly private business,
which, though for the entertainment of the public, is always limited
to those whom he may agree to admit to it (provided he cannot refuse
admission on account of race and color); that penal statutes must be
strictly construed; that the art of subtle reasoning should not be
employed to bring within the folds of the statute acts which would
not otherwise be an offense, should the defendant have been permitted
to show that the accommodations offered were equal and sufficient
to those accorded others in the theatre? Accepting appellee's contention that this 'right' was 'to admit and accommodate,' the title to the
act might well have read 'equal and sufficient right.'...Had the
legislature, in view of the law as it existed, wished this 'right' to be
the same right, they should have said so in plain language ....
The
common law recognized the right to make different classes of accommodation and one was accommodated when enjoying any one of
those classes...."
Commonwealth v. Oberbeck, 32 Am. L. Reg. (n.s.) 753 (Pa. C. P.1889).
See also Puritan Lunch Co. v. Forman, 29 Ohio Ct. App. 289, 295
(1918), which, in applying the separate but equal doctrine to restaurants, said: "This rule of requirement does not call for identity of
accommodation, but it does mean substantial equality of service...."
Crosswaith v. Bergin, 95 Colo. 241, 35 P.2d 848 (1934); Puritan Lunch
Co. v. Forman, 29 Ohio Ct. App. 289 (1918). In Fruchey v. Eagleson,
15 Ind. App. 88, 101-02, 43 N.E. 146, 150 (1896), the court said: "Even
if... the clerk of the hotel agreed to permit appellee to stop there
on condition that he would take his meals in the 'ordinary,' and
away from the other guests, it would be a denial of equal privileges,
such as the statute contemplates ....
"
Randall v. Cowlitz Amusements, 194 Wash. 82, 76 P.2d 1017 (1938).
In Pickett v. Kuchan, 323 III. 138, 142, 153 N.E. 667, 669 (1926), the
court declared: "It was no defense to the action to show that appellant
offered to sell to appellee a ticket to the gallery. Proof of the refusal
to sell her, on account of her race, the ticket requested entitled her
to a verdict."
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it is in the white section of the theater. 20 9 But several cases do flatly
outlaw segregation under the statutes. 210
For example, in one case it was held that segregation in a
motion picture theater was not permissible because the statute
gave all persons the "full enjoyment" of the theater. The court
argued that they were entitled to enjoy the privileges of the theater
alike with white patrons, and that if white patrons were seated in
the center and they were seated on the sides they were thereby
denied the privilege of sitting in the center.211 This refines "full enjoyment" or equal privileges too far. If the sections are equally good,
all patrons have equal enjoyment. Not everybody can sit in the same
seat, and some method has to be allocated for distributing seats.
There is no more reason for distributing them at random than any
other way. As long as the seats are equally good, who is allotted
what seat is immaterial to the enjoyment of the theater.
212
Probably the leading case in this field is Ferguson v. Giles.
In this case, a restaurant owner refused to serve a Negro on one
side of a room, but offered to serve him on the other side. The
lower court held that this was satisfactory compliance with a
statute giving all persons full and equal accommodations. 213 The
209

Joyner v. Moore-Wiggins Co., 152 App. Div. 266, 136 N.Y.S. 578

210

(1912), aff'd, 211 N.Y. 522, 105 N.E. 1088 (1914).
Suttles v. Hollywood Turf Club, 45 Cal. App. 2d 283, 114 P.2d 27
(1941); Jones v. Kehrlein, 49 Cal. App. 646, 194 P. 55 (1920); Baylies

211

212
213

v. Curry, 128 Ill. 287, 21 N.E. 595 (1889); Matter of Rollercade Skating
Rink, 7 RACE REL. L. REP. 985 (Ohio Civil Rights Comm. 1962). See
also Hull v. Eighty-Sixth St. Amusement Co., 144 N.Y.S. 318 (Sup.
Ct. 1913), holding that the Civil Rights Law does not prevent seating
on a first-come, first-served basis.
Guy v. Tri-State Amusement Co., 7 Ohio App. 509, 513 (1917): "It
might be contended here that these persons had just as good an
opportunity to see the pictures or vaudeville performance, if such
there may have been, seated on the right-hand side, as if they were
seated in the center section. However, if these colored people were
required to be so seated they would only be allowed partial enjoyment of the privileges of that theater, because white persons were
permitted to occupy the center section; that is to say, colored people
could enjoy the privilege of seeing the pictures, they could enjoy
the privilege of hearing the music, they might enjoy the privilege
of greeting their friends and acquaintances within the building, at
the same time they were certainly denied some of the privileges that
were given to persons of the white race, because the latter might
enjoy the privilege of the center section of seats."
82 Mich. 358, 46 N.W. 718 (1890).
The trial judge charged the jury: "While the defendant had no right
to make a rule providing for an unjust discrimination, still he would
have the right, under the law, to make proper and reasonable rules

for the conduct of his business, and governing the conduct of his
patrons; and whether this was a reasonable rule I will submit to you

FREEDOM OF CHOICE IN ACCOMMODATION

Supreme Court of Michigan reversed the trial court. It held that
the statute forbade segregation in public places. The reasoning
of the court, that segregation by a restaurant owner was a denial
of equality before the law,214 is clearly inapplicable, for even if
segregation were a denial of equality, that denial was not made by
law, but only by a private person.21 5 The reason why segregation
violated the statute is equally hard to follow. The court's reasoning
on this point consisted largely of dec]amation on racial prejudice.2 10
Finally, the court denied that its interpretation of the statute
infringed on freedom of choice in association. It said:
for determination. Thus, the defendant has the right to reserve certain
portions of his business for ladies, and other portions for gentlemen,
while he may also reserve other portions for his regular patrons or
boarders. He might also, under the law, reserve certain tables for
white men, and others where colored men would be served, providing
there be no unjust discrimination. And this brings me to an explanation of the term which I have used, viz., 'full and equal accommodations.' By this term 'full and equal' is not meant identical accommodations, but by it is meant substantially the same accommodation. A
guest at a restaurant has no more right to insist upon sitting at a
particular table than a guest at a hotel has the right to demand a
particular room, as long as the accommodations offered are substantially the same. This is all the law demands and requires .... Id. at 362,
46 N.W. at 719.
214 The court said on this point: "But in Michigan there must be and is
an absolute, unconditional equality of white and colored men before
the law. The white man can have no rights or privileges under the
law that is denied to the black man. Socially people may do as they
please within the law, and whites may associate together, as may
blacks, and exclude whom they please from their dwellings and
private grounds; but there can be no separation in public places
between people on account of their color alone which the law will
sanction.... This statute exemplifies the changed feeling of our people
towards the African race, and places the colored man upon a perfect
equality with all others, before the law in this state. Under it, no
line can be drawn in the streets, public parks, or public buildings
upon one side of which the black man must stop and stay, while
the white man may enjoy the other side, or both sides, at his will and
pleasure; nor can such a line of separation be drawn in any of the
public places or conveyances mentioned in this act." Id. at 363, 46
N.W. at 720.
215 See Avins, The Civil Rights Act of 1875: Some Reflected Light on the
Fourteenth Amendment and Public Accommodations, 66 COLum. L.
REV. 873 (1966).
210 The following is a fair sample of this declamation: "Because it was
divinely ordained that the skin of one man should not be as white
as that of another furnishes no more reason that he should have less
rights and privileges under the law than if he had been born white,
but cross-eyed, or otherwise deformed. The law, as I understand it,
will never permit a color or misfortune, that God has fastened upon
a man from his birth, to be punished by the law unless the misfortune
leads to some contagion or criminal act; nor while he is sane and
honest can he have less privileges than his more fortunate brothers.
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The man who goes either by himself or with his family to a public
place must expect to meet and mingle with all classes of people.
He cannot ask, to suit his caprice or prejudice or social views, that
this or that man shall be excluded because he does not wish to
associate with them. He may draw his social line as closely as he
chooses at home, or in other private places, but he cannot in a
public place carry the privacy of his home with him, or ask that
people not as good or great as he is shall step aside when he
appears. All citizens who conform to the law have the same rights
in such places, without regard to race, color, or condition of birth
or wealth. The enforcement of the principles of the Michigan civil
rights act of 1885 interferes with the social rights of no man, but it
clearly emphasizes the legal rights of all men in public places.217

This proposition, of course, assumes the very point to be decided.
If a restaurant is a private business, then a customer has the right
to influence the owner to separate other customers from him, if
he can. Whether the owner will do so depends on whether the
owner finds it profitable to accede to the request. If the owner
declines the request, the customer may leave and go elsewhere
to a restaurant which caters to his associational preferences. If an
automobile executive does not want to eat with mechanics, for
example, he may not be able to persuade Joe of Joe's Greasy
Spoon, whose customers are 99 percent mechanics, to segregate
them. However, he has the option of patronizing the Ritz, the
owner of which, to keep his executive trade, may well segregate
persons in humbler stations of life. In this way, the executive's freedom of choice in association is preserved. Accordingly, the court's
statement that a person, when he leaves his home, should expect
to have to mingle with all classes of persons, is entirely unjustified,
absent government interference.
If the government restricts the scope of the restaurant owner's
discretion, it in effect denies freedom of choice to the customer,
who cannot legally attempt, along with other customers of like
disposition, to influence the owner to adopt a policy more to their
The law is tender, rather than harsh, towards all infirmity; and, if
to be born black is a misfortune, then the law should lessen, rather
than increase, the burden of the black man's life.
"The prejudice against association in public places with the Negro,
which does exist, to some extent, in all communities, less now than
formerly, is unworthy of our race; and it is not for the courts to
cater to or temporize with a prejudice which is not only not humane,
but unreasonable. Nor shall I ever be willing to deny to any man
any rights and privileges that belong in law to any other man, simply
because the Creator colored him differently from others, or made him
less handsome than his fellows...." Ferguson v. Giles, 82 Mich. 358,
217

367, 46 N.W. 718, 721 (1890).

Id. at 367-68, 46 N.W. at 721. But see Central R.R. v. Green, 86 Pa. St.
427 (1878), holding that an anti-segregation law in respect to railroads is deemed penal.
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liking. Under common law, the owner may ignore their associational
preferences, or may accede to them, as he values their patronage.
But if government forbids all restaurants to accede to the associational preferences of the customers, then their ability to find some
proprietor who will comply is eliminated.
This point is illustrated by a case which involved a phrase in
a brochure sent out by a resort hotel in the mountains used primarily for vacations saying: "Serving Christian Clientele Since
1911." The New York State Commission Against Discrimination
declared that use of this phrase was illegal since it "unmistakably
conveys the idea that the resort solicits guests of one religious
creed." 218 A similar ruling was made when a resort farm advertised
that it had served a "gentile clientele" for 63 years. 219 Likewise, in
Camp-of-the-Pines v. New York Times Co., 220 the court ruled that
a summer resort camp cannot publish an advertisement saying
"selected clientele," "restricted clientele," or "restricted" on the
ground that this violated the law against discrimination. The court
declared: "As a practical matter such words as 'selected clientele'
connote in the public mind that colored persons, Jews, and others
who are not My-white need not apply to plaintiff for accommodation." 221 The court also said:
The duty of courts is ever to be watchful and alert against open
as well as covert and stealthy attacks and encroachments against
the social as well as the political and economical (sic) rights of
persons.... Our Constitution guarantees every citizen the right
to life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness. It sternly prohibits
religious intolerance. Section 40 of the Civil Rights Law is a laudable effort to blot out racial hatred. It strikes at the bigot and all
218

219

220
221

State Commission Against Discrimination v. Trowbridge, 5 RAcE

RE..

L. REP. 552, 556 (1960). But see Trowbridge v. Katzen, 23 Misc. 111,
114, 203 N.Y.S. 2d 736, 739 (1960), rev'd. 14 A.2d 608, 218 N.Y.S.2d 808
(1961): "It is not unusual to read advertisements which state 'Italian
cuisine,' 'French cooking,' or 'Kosher diet observed." Would one say that
such descriptive words would establish that the author was engaging
in a discriminatory practice pursuant to the provisions of the aforesaid
statute .... It is unfair to determine that such a practice has been
employed by indulging in a strained and sensitive interpretation of
the meaning and purpose of the wording used."
Op. No. 2524, Ops. ATTY. GEN. Mc., 1 RACE REL. L. REP. 988, 990
(1956): "The words 'for 63 years we have served a gentile clientele'
can have only one purpose and meaning in the understanding of the
general public; namely, to communicate the idea that Jews are not
welcome, not desired and not solicited by those responsible for issuing
the calendar containing the language under discussion. Thus, the
words are restrictive in design and intent, though artfully worded,
and constitute a 'cloak and disguise and are indirect means to hide
discrimination.'"
184 Misc. 389, 53 N.Y.S.2d 475 (1945).
Id. at 398, 53 N.Y.S.2d at 484.
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promoters of discord and unhappiness. Every effort is made and
should be made and it is the duty of the courts to prevent,
so far
222
as is humanly possible, social and economic ostracism.

It is interesting to note that although state anti-discrimination
laws now prohibit a proprietor from segregating his premises to
satisfy the associational preferences of those who do not want
integrated facilities, they also compel him to satisfy those who
want integrated service. This is fairly recent law. In 1918, the
lower courts in New York held that the thrust of anti-discrimination laws was to compel service and not to satisfy integrationists.
They therefore ruled that a restaurant could refuse to serve white
persons who accompanied a Negro. One court said: "We think it is
quite plain that that act cannot be availed of by a white man
because of discrimination against him that is based upon his asso'2
ciation with colored men."

2

However, more recently it has been held that a person cannot
be excluded from an amusement park because he belongs to the
NAACP or a local integrationist group.224 It has also been held
that a Negro and his white wife are both entitled to damages from
222
223

224

Id. at 399-400, 53 N.Y.S.2d at 485.

Matthews v. Hotz, 173 N.Y.S. 234, 235 (Sup. Ct. 1918). In Cohn v.
Goldgraben, 103 Misc. 500, 501, 170 N.Y.S. 407, 407-08 (Sup. Ct. 1918),
the court said: "There was no refusal to serve because of color or
race. The plaintiff was white, and his companion was colored. They
were both refused service, so it could not have been on account of
color. It was as stated by the waiter, because the rule forbade serving
'mixed parties.' The rule that 'mixed parties' should not be served
applied to white as well as colored. There was no discrimination as
to one color in favor of the other. The record plainly indicates that
both parties would have been served at separate tables, and that
plaintiff knew this, and refused service at a separate table. Hew can
it be said, then, that he was refused service because of his color?
"I do not think the refusal to serve 'mixed parties,' white and
colored, at the same table, when there is a willingness to serve the
same people at separate tables, should be construed as a violation of
the statute. The rights granted to the citizen by the statute are
strictly personal, and the statute may only be invoked when the
refusal is based upon the ground personal to the plaintiff. The plaintiff was not refused service solely upon his own color, but upon the
fact that his companion had a different color. Had the plaintiff been
alone, or had he separated himself from his companion, he would
have been served."
See Fletcher v. Coney Island, Inc., 121 N.E.2d 574, 581 (Ohio C.P.
1954), rev'd on other grounds, 100 Ohio App. 259, 136 N.E.2d 344 (1955),
ajf'd, 165 Ohio St. 150, 134 N.E.2d 371 (1956): "The blanket exclusion
of all members and of all persons who associate with members of a
particular group or organization, because of the misconduct of some
members and without regard to the fact that a particular person who
may be affected by such blanket exclusion is without personal fault,
is not a reason applicable alike to all other citizens."
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a hotel which excludes them because of their miscegenation.2 5
Another court has ruled that the anti-discrimination law prohibits
a landlord from raising the rent of a white woman for receiving
226
Negro visitors.
The federal law is now the same. Under Title II of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964,227 segregation is forbidden in restaurants2 and
movie theaters. 229 Thus, it has been held that a short-order food
and beverage stand which serves whites at two windows and
Negroes at a third window violates the federal law, even though
there is no difference between the windows or the service. 230
Even without benefit of statute, a number of federal cases have
forbidden discrimination. It has been held that segregation in a
restaurant, or separate restrooms and drinking fountains, in an area
leased from a municipal airport 231 or toll road232 violates the fourteenth amendment. The same ruling has been made in respect to
transportation facilities 233 and hospitals which receive government
funds.2 3 4 The Fifth Circuit has even decided that a franchised public
utility cannot enforce its segregation rule by arrest and criminal
35
sanctions.
The commerce clause has also been pressed into the integration fray. Although the Supreme Court has decided that state antidiscrimination laws do not burden interstate or foreign commerce 2 36
it has held that racial segregation in restaurants attached to bus
Hobson v. York Studios, 208 Misc. 888, 145 N.Y.S.2d 162 (1955).
McGill v. 830 S. Michigan Hotel, 68 IM.App. 2d 351, 216 N.E.2d 273
(1966).
227 78 Stat. 243, 42 U.S.C. § § 2000a-2000a-b (1964).
228 United States v. Bradshaw, 12 RACE REL. L. REP. 1022 (U.S.D.C.,
E.D. N.C. 1967); United States v. Moorefield, 11 RAcE REL. L. REP.
2008 (U.S.D.C., W.D. Va. 1966).
229 Bryan v. Guillory, 11 RACE REL. L. REP. 426 (U.S.D.C., W.D. La. 1965);
225
226

United States v. Gulf-State Theatres, Inc., 256 F. Supp. 549 (N.D.
Miss. 1966); Thomas v. Orangeburg Theatres, Inc., 241 F. Supp. 317
(E.D. S.C. 1965).
230 Davis v. Hill, 11 RAcE REL. L. REP. 425 (U.S.D.C., S.D. Ala. 1965).
231 Turner v. City of Memphis, 369 U.S. 350 (1962); Adams v. City of New
Orleans, 208 F. Supp. 427 (E.D. La. 1962), affd, 321 F.2d 493 (5th Cir.
1963); United States v. City of Shreveport, 210 F.Supp. 36 (W.D. La.
1962).
232 MeDuffie v. Florida Turnpike Authority, 7 RACE REL. L. REP. 505
(U.S.D.C., S.D. Fla. 1962); cf. Muir v. Louisville Park Theatrical Assn.,
202 F.2d 275 (6th Cir. 1953), vacated, 347 U.S. 971 (1954).
238 United States v. Lassiter, 203 F. Supp. 20 (W.D. La. 1962).
234 Simkins v. Moses H. Cone Memorial Hospital, 323 F.2d 959 (4th Cir.
1963), cert. denied, 376 U.S. 938 (1964).
235 Boman v. Birmingham Transit Co., 280 F.2d 531 (5th Cir. 1960).
236 Bob-Lo Excursion Co. v. Michigan, 333 U.S. 28 (1948).
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terminals is "unjust discrimination" forbidden by the Interstate
Commerce Act.237 In one case, the Sixth Circuit forbade a bus company to enforce a segregation rule in respect to interstate passengers on the ground that this rule was a burden on interstate
commerce because the passengers would have to change their
seats. The court rejected cases "drawing a distinction between the
action of a state in attempting to regulate the business of a carrier
and the right of a carrier to operate its own business. '238 But the
opinion clearly indicates that ideological considerations, rather than
an overriding concern for the free flow of commerce, was decisive
239
here.
While the business concern covered by federal law can make
no concession to those who wish to segregate themselves, it must
give effect to the associational preferences of integrationists. Thus,
the Fifth Circuit has recently held that a restaurant may not refuse
to serve a white person because he is actively engaged in helping
Negroes desegregate the restaurant. 240

It is hardly surprising that these policies have brought forth vehement protests. As early as 1893, one writer observed that compulsory integration gave Negroes superior rights, a status which
could not be justified.241 Two years before the Supreme Court
eliminated segregation, a federal judge remarked that government
242
had no right to interfere with natural associational preferences.
27
238
239

Boynton v. Virginia, 364 U.S. 454 (1960).
Whiteside v. Southern Bus Lines, 177 F.2d 949, 953 (6th Cir. 1949).
Id. at 951, where the court said: "It may be that in a period when the

democratic way of life is challenged by another political and economic

240
241

242

faith, the times invite a reappraisal of the scope of the Fourteenth
Amendment to the end that in our effort to contain ideological concepts of government conflicting with our own (which have already...
swept over half of Europe and great areas of Asia...), local practices
may more nearly conform to our democratic professions."
Offner v. Shell's City, Inc., 376 F.2d 574 (5th Cir. 1967).
Wister, Discrimination Not Between Sex But the Color of Citizens,
32 Amvi. L. REG. (n.s.) 748, 756 (1893): "The above line of cases, taken
from before 1861 until 1893, sets forth very clearly the history of a
national prejudice, and our progress from an inhuman and unenlightened attitude through an oversentimental attempt to correct this
(1867-1870), resulting in statutes and decisions which practically (as
Judge Paxson pointed out) gave the blacks superior rights, to a
poised and temperate level of common-sense, in which the courts
most usually declare that in any community where the relations
between the two races are of such a character that a compulsory
herding of them together is likely to result in breaches of the peace
or discomfort, in such circumstances it is wise and proper that they
should have equally good but separate accommodations."
Hayes v. Crutcher, 108 F. Supp. 582, 585 (M.D. Tenn. 1952): "It seems
that segregation is not only recognized in constitutional law and
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However, the most elaborate and pointed criticism of compulsory integration in business activities was penned by Judge Mallery
of the Washington State Supreme Court in Price v. Evergreen
Cemetery Co. 243 Here, the defendant cemetery had an integrated
section and a segregated white section. A Negro couple who wanted
to bury a dead child was offered a plot of ground in the integrated
section. They demanded the right to bury the child in the white
section. When the cemetery refused, they sued for damages under
the state anti-discrimination law. The majority of the court ruled
on another point. However, Judge Mallery attacked the N.A.A.C.P.,
which had backed the suit, for seeking special privileges for Negroes, and the right to infringe on freedom of association of white
2 44
persons.
He observed:

This case demonstrates that the Negro desegregation program is
not limited to public affairs. The right of white people to enjoy a
choice of associates in their private lives is marked for extinction
by the N.A.A.C.P. Compulsory total togetherness of Negroes and
whites is to be achieved by judicial decrees in a series of Negro
court actions.245
Judge Mallery concluded:
A victorious crusade of the N.A.A.C.P. for the special privilege of
Negroes to intrude upon white people in their private affairs can
judicial decision, but that it is also supported by general principles of
natural law. As nature has produced different species, so it has produced different races of men.... [I]t seems natural and customary
for different species and different races to recognize and prefer as
intimate associates their own kind ....
"But our Government and its
law does not intrude into the private and social affairs of life. In their
private and social affairs all men are free."
243 57 Wash. 2d 352, 357 P.2d 702 (1960).
244 Id. at 355, 357 P.2d at 704, where he protested: "In view of the cemetery's long-standing segregation restrictions, it could not sell the
Negro appellants a burial plot in 'Babyland.' The white parents who
have relied upon the white restriction in question have acquired a
right to the association of their own race exclusively. It is this specific right of segregation which this particular case in a series was
brought to eliminate.
"The appellants' grievance is the mere existence of any exclusive
section for white children into which Negroes cannot intrude at will
In view of the fact that the respondent cemetery provides unsegregated facilities of equal quality for the general public, including
Negroes, there is no other possible issue herein than that of compulsory total desegregation in cemeteries."
"This lawsuit is but an incident, the second of a series, in the over-all
Negro crusade to judically deprive white people of their right to
choose their associates in their private affairs."
"The Negro race, ably led by N.A.A.C.P., makes the result of every
Negro lawsuit the measure of its success in securing not only rights
equal to whites in public affairs, but also of special privileges for
Negroes in private affairs."
245 Id. at 355, 357 P.2d at 703.
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only be won at the expense of the traditional freedom of personal
association which has always characterized the free world. Unfortunately, special privileges seem preferable on the part of those
who enjoy them to other people's freedom. Specifically, Negroes
rate their special privilege of compulsory private association more
highly than the ancient right of white people to enjoy voluntary
association.
From time immemorial the scope and extent of an individual's
choice in his private affairs has been the Anglo-Saxon measure of
his liberties. No individual right has been more cherished than the
right to choose one's associates. Regimentation in the private affairs
of life, on the other hand, has been the badge of the police state.
It remains to be seen how resistant our ancient liberties of private association will be to the variety of mass pressures being
mobilized by the N.A.A.C.P. It is, indeed, a concerted and aggressive force to be reckoned with. Experience has shown that an
aggressive minority can frequently exact special privileges from
an indifferent majority. It may be that the realization of the Negro
dream of compulsory total togetherness is just around the corner.246

IV.

COMPULSORY INTEGRATION IN PUBLIC FACILITIES
A. TRANSPORTATION
A year after Brown v. Board of Education247 was decided, the
Interstate Commerce Commission applied the sociological rationale
of that case to railroads, and ended the right of interstate railroads
to segregate their passengers, 248 which right the Supreme Court
had sanctioned almost a half century before.249 Almost simultaneously, the Commission forbade segregated seating on interstate
buses; 250 somewhat later, it ruled that bus companies could not
segregate terminal facilities based on race, creed, color, or national origin. 251 In 1956, without giving any reason, the Supreme
Court upheld a lower court decision holding that state segregation
2 52
statutes as they apply to transportation are unconstitutional.
246

Id. at 357, 357 P.2d at 704-05.

It

347 U.S. 483 (1954).
N.A.A.C.P. v. St. Louis-San Francisco Railway Co., 297 I.C.C. 335, 347
(1955): "The disadvantages to a traveler who is assigned accommodations or facilities so designated as to imply his inherent inferiority
solely because of his race must be regarded under present conditions
as unreasonable. Also, he is entitled to be free of annoyances, some
petty and some substantial, which almost inevitably accompany segregation even though the rail carriers, as most of the defendants have
done here, sincerely try to provide both races with equally convenient
and comfortable cars and waiting rooms."
249 Chiles v. Chesapeake & Ohio R., 218 U.S. 71 (1910).
250 Keys v. Carolina Coach Co., 64 M.C.C. 769 (1955).
251 Discrimination in Operation of Interstate Motor Carriers of Passengers,
86 M.C.C. 743 (1961).
252 Browder v. Gayle, 142 F. Supp. 707 (M.D. Ala. 1956), affd, 352 U.S.
247
248

903 (1956).
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has also been held a violation of the fourteenth amendment for a
municipal airport to segregate waiting rooms 25
2 54
facilities.

or restaurant

The rationale of the application of Brown to transportation
facilities has not been explained by the Supreme Court. One district
judge has asserted that segregated recreational facilities involve
,dnly a lesser psychological injury than do segregated school
facilities, 255 but the reasoning behind this remains as mystifying

to this author as it does to several federal judges. One judge
observed:
Besides, the Court rested its opinion in the Brown case almost
exclusively upon sociological and psychological factors. It discussed such intangibles as opportunities to exchange in discussions
and to exchange views with students of a different race, and the
supposed sociological effect which segregation might have on a

Negro child's motivation to learn. The whole basis of the deci-

sion is the claimed adverse effect which segregation has on the
educational and mental development of Negro children, or as
otherwise stated, 'the children of the minority group.' Certainly,
no such effect can be legitimately claimed in the field of bus transportation.256One's education and personality is not developed on a
city bus.

In addition, the Fifth Circuit has refused to hear evidence that the
psychological factors involved in Brown do not apply to park and
Henry v. Greenville Airport Comm'n, 284 F.2d 631, 279 F.2d 751
(4th Cir. 1960); United States v. City of Montgomery, 201 F. Supp
590 (M.D. Ala. 1962); Brooks v. City of Tallahassee, 6 RACE RED. L.RE
1099 (U.S.D.C., N.D. Fla. 1961). See generally, Dixon, Civil Rights iA
Air Transportation and Government Initiative, 49 VA. L. REv. 205
(1963).
254 United States v. City of Montgomery, 201 F. Supp. 590 (M.D. Ala.
1962); Coke v. City of Atlanta, 184 F. Supp. 579 (N.D. Ga. 1960).
See also Castle v. Davis, 9 RACE REL. L. REP. 884 (U.S.D.C., E.D.
La. 1964), enjoining segregation in a city hall cafeteria.
255 See Fayson v. Beard, 134 F. Supp. 379, 381-82 (E.D. Tex. 1955): "If
the provisions for equal tangible facilities in the field of public education do not eliminate intangible or psychological discrimination in the
field of public education, how can it reasonably be said that equality
in tangibles in the field of public recreation eliminates psychological
factors so clearly involved in segregation based upon the color of a
253

man's skin?"

256

"It can, of course, be argued that the intangibles are less effective
in the public recreational field than in the field of public education,
but that is to say that a little discrimination is to be condoned, but
a great deal should be condemned. If the reasoning in the School Segregation Cases concerning psychological factors is sound as it relates to
public education, then it must necessarily apply to the field of public
recreation."
Flemming v. South Carolina Elec. & Gas Co., 128 F. Supp. 469, 470
(E.D. S.C. 1955), rev'd, 224 F.2d 752 (4th Cir. 1955), appeal denied,

351 U.S. 901 (1956).
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golf course segregation; 257 presumably this disinterest would apply
to transportation also. So the psychological factors are hardly
decisive.
Finally, no blanket condemnation can be made of carrier segregation on the theory that it infringes on freedom of association.
One federal judge put the matter as follows:
A like comment properly should be made concerning the further

assertion in plaintiff's affidavit that he 'was required to be segregated.' What that loose expression means is any one's guess. From

whom was he segregated? The affidavit doesn't say. Was he segregated from his family or from his friends, acquaintances or associates, from those who desired his company and he theirs? There
is nothing in the affidavit to indicate such to be true. Was he segregated from people whom he did not know and who did not care
to know him? The affidavit is silent as to that also. But suppose
he was segregated from people who did not care for his company
or association. What civil right of his was thereby invaded? If he
was trying to invade the civil rights of others, an injunction might
be more properly invoked against him to protect their civil rights.
I know of no civil or uncivil right that any one has, be he white
or colored, to deliberately make a nuisance of himself to the annoyance of others, even in an effort to create or stir up litigation. The
right to equality before the law, to be free from discrimination,
invests no one with authority to require others to accept him as
a companion or social equal. The Fourteenth Amendment does not
reach that low level. Even whites, as yet, still have
the right to
258
choose their own companions and associates ....

B. RECREATIONAL FAcILITIEs
The Supreme Court has applied the Brown doctrine to recreational facilities, holding that state or municipal facilities cannot be
segregated. 259 Likewise, facilities leased from state or local govern257
258

259

New Orleans City Park Improvement Assn. v. Detiege, 252 F.2d 122
(5th Cir. 1958), af'd, 358 U.S. 54 (1958).
Henry v. Greenville Airport Comm'n, 175 F. Supp. 343, 347 (W.D.
S.C. 1959), rev'd on other grounds, 279 F.2d 751 (4th Cir. 1960).
Barthe v. City of New Orleans, 219 F. Supp. 788 (E.D. La. 1963), aff'd,
376 U.S. 189 (1964) (city may not segregate parks, playgrounds, community centers); Holmes v. City of Atlanta, 350 U.S. 879 (1955);
Anderson v. City of Albany, 321 F.2d 649 (5th Cir. 1963) (segregation
enjoined in public parks, tennis courts, swimming pools, library and
auditorium); Freeman v. City of Little Rock, 8 RACE L. Re. L. REP.
173 (U.S.D.C., E.D. Ark. 1963) (segregation enjoined in auditorium,
parks, playgrounds, golf courses, tennis courts, and comfort facilities);
Hampton v. City of Jacksonville, 5 RACE RE,. L. REP. 1145 (U.S.D.C.,
S.D. Fla. 1960) (desegregation ordered in city-owned parks, playgrounds, tennis courts, swimming pools, football fields, baseball park,
zoo, and facilities therein such as separate entrances, rest rooms, and
drinking fountains); Anderson v. Kelly, 9 RACE REL. L. REP. 1382
(U.S.D.C., M.D. Ga. 1963) (segregation enjoined in publicly operated

FREEDOM OF CHOICE IN ACCOMMODATION

ment cannot discriminate against Negroes 60 Little more than
ipse dixit has been offered to justify extending Brown to parks,
playgrounds, golf courses, and community centers, 2 1 and the reasons are not apparent from the nature of the facilities.
For example, park segregation has been declared unconstitutiona 26 2 even though as a result freedom of choice in association
may thereby be infringed. The Fifth Circuit thus observed:
Unfortunately, the public parks of the City of Montgomery are
comparatively small in size. The largest, Oak Park, consists of
about 40 acres in the form of a square. If public parks no larger
than that are operated on a nonsegregated basis, the probable
breach of another right becomes imminent; that is, the right of
each person to select his own associates. We can only call attention
to the limit of the pertinent constitutional provision as construed
by the Supreme Court, i.e., that it does not compel the mixing of
the different races in the public parks.... 'Neither the Fifth nor the
Fourteenth Amendment operates positively to command integration of the races but263only negatively to forbid governmentally
enforced segregation.'
Segregation has also been forbidden on government-owned golf
courses, 2 " although several federal judges have followed this rul-

260
261

262

263
264

libraries, auditorium, parks and playground). In Holly v. City of Portsmouth, 150 F. Supp. 6, 7 (E.D. Va. 1957), the court observed: "There
is no longer any room for doubt that the separate but equal doctrine
has ceased to exist with respect to governmental facilities including
golf courses, swimming pools, bathing beaches, parks, etc."
Dukes v. Madison County, 10 RAcE REL.L. REP. 1274 (U.S.D.C., M.D.
Fla. 1965).
In Watson v. City of Memphis, 373 U.S. 526, .538 (1963), the court
said: "In support of its judgment, the District Court also pointed out
that the recreational facilities available for Negroes were roughly
proportional to their number and therefore presumably adequate to
meet their needs.... [e]ven if true, it reflects an impermissible obeisance to the now thoroughly discredited doctrine of 'separate but
equal.' The sufficiency of Negro facilities is beside the point; it is
the segregation by race that is unconstitutional."
New Orleans City Park Improvement Assn. v. Detiege, 252 F.2d
122 (5th Cir. 1958), aff'd, 358 U.S. 54 (1958); Brown v. Lee, 331
F.2d 142 (4th Cir. 1964); Hanes v. Shuttlesworth, 310 F.2d 303 (5th
Cir. 1962); Brown v. South Carolina State Forestry Comm'n, 226
F. Supp. 646 (E.D.S.C. 1963); Willie v. Harris Co., 202 F. Supp. 549
(S.D. Tex. 1962); Fayson v. Beard, 134 F. Supp. 379 (E.D. Tex. 1955).
City of Montgomery v. Gilmore, 277 F.2d 364, 369 (5th Cir. 1960).
Wolfe v. North Carolina, 364 U.S. 177, 182 (1960); New Orleans City
Park Improvement Ass'n v. Detiege, 252 F.2d 122 (5th Cir. 1958);
Cummings v. City of Charleston, 288 F.2d 817 (4th Cir. 1961); Ward
v. City of Miami, 151 F. Supp. 593 (S.D. Fla. 1957) affd, 252 F.2d 787
(5th Cir. 1958); Moorhead v. City of Ft. Lauderdale, 152 F. Supp.
131 (S.D. Fla. 1957), aff'd, 248 F.2d 544 (5th Cir. 1957); Hayes v.
Crutcher, 137 F. Supp. 853 (M.D. Tenn. 1956); State v. Cooke, 248 N.C.
485, 103 S.E.2d 846 (1958).
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ing with extreme reluctance. 26 5 Desegregation has also been ordered
for beaches, bathhouses, and swimming pools. 26 6 The fact that this
right also results in infringements on freedom of choice in association has likewise been deemed irrelevant. 267 But it has been held
that a municipal swimming pool may be restricted to residents of
In Lagarde v. Recreation and Park Comm'n, 229 F. Supp. 379, 383
(E.D. La. 1964), the court said: "It is no longer a valid defense to
show that an order to desegregate these facilities might result in
the closure of all public recreational facilities in the City and Parish,
thus depriving all persons, of all races, of the excellent facilities
which are now available in Baton Rouge to both races, on a traditional, well-managed, segregated basis." In Cummings v. City of
Charleston, 5 RACE REL. L. REP. 1137, 1139 (U.S.D.C., E.D.S.C. 1960),
the court protested: "The cases are clear and I am bound by my
judicial oath to follow them. I do so with reluctance, and with the
hope and belief that Congress will some day pass legislation forbidding the Supreme Court from rendering decisions not supported by
the Constitution."
266 Dawson v. Mayor, 220 F.2d 386 (4th Cir. 1955), aff'd, 350 U.S. 887
(1955); Tonkins v. City of Greensboro, 162 F. Supp. 549 (M.D. N.C.
1958), 175 F. Supp. 476 (M.D. N.C. 1959), aff'd, 276 F.2d 890 (4th Cir.
1960); Lagarde v. Recreation and Park Comm'n, 229 F. Supp. 379
(E.D. La. 1964); Brown v. South Carolina State Forestry Comm'n,
226 F. Supp. 646 (E.D.S.C. 1963); House v. City of Grenada, 262 F.
Supp. 19 (N.D. Miss. 1966); Wood v. Vaughn, 209 F. Supp. 106 (W.D.
Va. 1962). See also Bullock v. Wooding, 123 N.J.L. 176, 8 A.2d 273
(Sup. Ct. 1939) (segregation of Negroes on public beaches is unconstitutional and a municipality cannot reserve three beaches for white
persons); Patterson v. Board of Education, 11 N.J. Misc. 179, 164 A.
892 (Sup. Ct. 1933), aff'd, 112 N.J.L. 99, 169 A. 690 (Ct. Err. & App.
1934) (a segregated public high school swimming pool constitutes
unlawful discrimination).
267 In Williams v. Kansas City, 104 F.Supp. 848, 852-53 (W.D. Mo. 1952),
afT'd, 205 F.2d 47 (8th Cir. 1953), cert. denied, 346 U.S. 826 (1953), the
court declared: "Defendants further assert that their policy of operating separate swimming pools for the two races is reenforced by a
recognized natural aversion to physical intimacy inherent in the use
of swimming pools by members of races that do not mingle socially.
This policy, they say, conforms to a custom long established in the
local community of separate institutions, services, and facilities for
white persons and Negroes; that, based on the experience of other
communities, the use of the same swimming pool facilities of the
defendant City by both races would produce a condition detrimental
to the best interests of both races ....
Natural aversion to physical
intimacy among persons of different race, or their right to associate
with each other, contain no legal issues that may be considered or
determined in this action. Such matters are within the province of
ethics which deals with the science of moral duty and human actions.
This juridical action deals with matter in relation to the law of the
land. The argument so made by defendants, which it can only be
considered, is scarcely worthy of legal attention. It provides a court
with no legal guide to the principles of law here involved."
265
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the municipality; apparently geographic segregation is not an
unlawful discrimination. 2 68
26 9
Segregation has also been outlawed in a municipal auditorium,
baseball park and combination auditorium and ballroom where
27 1
litraryY72
musical entertainment is performed,2 70 state coliseum,
27
3
combination library and museum,
opera house,274 and public

skating rink.278 It has also been held that a segregated amusement

park only for Negroes is illegal.27 6 The Fifth Circuit has ruled that
a private corporation which leases land from the state for use as a
golf course must admit Negroes even if the lease is merely designed
to raise revenue for the state277 Indeed, it has even been decided
that where a city cannot act as a trustee to operate a park for
white persons only under a private trust and a new trustee cannot
be appointed to do so, the property must revert to the heirs since
278
the trust has failed.
Moreover, the federal courts have ruled that a state park cannot be segregated even if it would be unprofitable to operate it as
a desegregated facility.27 9 In addition, the fact that a city operates
a swimming pool in a proprietary capacity rather than a governmental capacity does not allow it to keep the pool segregated to
avoid loss of patronage.2 80 The Fourth Circuit, with Supreme Court
approval, has remarked that if police power "cannot be invoked to
sustain racial segregation in the schools, where attendance is compulsory and racial friction may be apprehended from the enforced
268 McClain v. City of South Pasadena, 155 Cal. App. 2d 423, 318 P.2d
269
270
271
272
273
274

199 (1957).
Bynum v. Schiro, 219 F. Supp. 204 (E.D. La. 1963).
Brown v. City of Richmond, 204 Va. 471, 132 S.E.2d 495 (1963).
Council of Federated Organizations v. Mississippi Fair Comm'n, 9 RAcE
REL. L. REP. 1390 (S.D. Miss. 1964).
James v. Carnegie Public Library, 235 F. Supp. 911 (E.D. S.C. 1964).
Cobb v. Montgomery Library Bd., 207 F. Supp. 880 (M.D. Ala. 1962).

Jones v. Marva Theatres, Inc., 180 F. Supp. 49 (D. Md. 1960).
275 Walker v. Shaw, 209 F. Supp. 569 (W.D. S.C. 1962).
278 Lincoln Beach Corp. v. Board of Comm'rs, 195 So.2d 367 (La. Ct.
App. 1967).
277 Wimbish v. Pinellas County, 342 F.2d 804 (5th Cir. 1965).
278 Evans v. Newton, 221 Ga. 870, 148 S.E.2d 329 (1966).
279 Tate v. Department of Conservation & Development, 133 F. Supp. 53
(E.D. Va. 1955), aff'd, 231 F.2d 615 (4th Cir. 1956), cert. denied, 352
U.S. 838 (1956).
280 City of St. Petersburg v. Alsup, 238 F.2d 830 (5th Cir. 1956). In
Shuttlesworth v. Gaylord, 202 F. Supp. 59, 63 (N.D. Ala. 1961), the
court said: "[s]egregated operation of recreational facilities may not
be justified as falling within the ambit of proprietary as distinguished
from governmental functions of the City government. It is also clear
that such segregated operation may not be justified as a means to
preserve public peace, and is not a proper exercise of police power."
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comingling of the races, it cannot be sustained with respect to
public beach, and bathhouse facilities, the use of which is entirely
optional."28 1
All of this points out in emphatic language that the Supreme
Court forbids segregation in recreational facilities, but fails to
tell why. In fact, the only case which attempts to explain in any
detail why Brown applies to recreational facilities is Mehta v. City
of Salisbury,2 2 decided by the High Court of Southern Rhodesia,
and affirmed on appeal on other grounds by the Federal Supreme
Court of the Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland, before the
breakup of that federation. In this case, the High Court held that
a municipality had no right to segregate its swimming pools by
race. The court cited the applicable American decisions, and argued
that the result was justified by intangible factors even where the
separate physical facilities were equal It said that when separate
facilities were provided for Europeans because they disliked swimming with Asians, the latter felt humiliated, insulted, and inferior.
The court asserted that individuals had a right to be free of offensive, degrading, or humiliating treatment which impaired their
dignity. It added that segregation of Europeans did not impair
their dignity because they wanted to be segregated. On this basis
the court distinguished segregation by sex or age from racial segregation.
The short answer to all of this is that no matter how segregation
is described by adjectives it is nothing more than a case of Europeans withdrawing themselves from the company of Asians or
others. Inasmuch as Europeans are equal in law to non-Europeans,
the law should demand equal respect for their feelings. Presumably, anybody has the right to withdraw his company from anybody else because he does not like the latter person, no matter how
offensive or degrading the latter person finds it and no matter how
humiliated, insulted, or inferior he may feel. Once it is established
that such a feeling is damnum absque injuria, it should give rise
to no rights or liabilities even though carried out on public property. The Saskatchewan Court of Appeal has rightly pointed out
that segregation is not necessarily in and of itself discrimination
even though based on ethnic factors. 28 3 If government manage281

Dawson v. Mayor, 220 F.2d 386, 387 (4th Cir. 1955), aff'd, 350 U.S.

887 (1955).

282

1961 Rhod. & N. Rep. 450, 1962 (1) So. Afr. L. Rep. 675, aff'd, 1961
Rhod. & N. Rep. 1000, 1962 (1) So. Afr. L. Rep. 691. Accord, see

Mabelreign Town Management Bd. v. Chamboko, 1962 Rhod. & N. L.
283

Rep. 450 (High Ct., S. Rhod.), aif'd, 1962 Rhod. & N.L. Rep. 493,
1962 (4) So. Afr. L. Rep. 156 (Fed. Sup. Ct.).

Bintner v. Regina Public School Ed. 55 D.L.R.2d 646 (Sask. C. A).
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ment allows Europeans to segregate themselves away on a government facility that, in itself, should not be deemed violative of the
rights of anybody else. The rationale for integration of recreational
facilities is as deficient in Southern Rhodesia as it is in the United
States.
C. MIEDICAL FAcmrLTEs
Another unexplained extension of Brown has been to the
medical field. The federal courts have required desegregation of a
nursing home 28 4 and the facilities of the state tuberculosis board. 28 5
One federal judge ruled that where a state maintains two tuberculosis sanitoria, one for Negro patients and the other for white
patients, a Negro tuberculosis patient is entitled to be admitted to
the white sanitarium, because segregation denies equal protection
of the laws.28 6 What the Negro patient has not been equally protected against was left to conjecture.
The major litigation has concerned hospitals. It has been held
that racial segregation of patients in wards, rooms, and restrooms
of municipal hospitals or of hospitals receiving either federal or
state grants is unconstitutional. 28 7 Such segregation has been enjoined even where the court found that it was beneficial to the
health of some of the patients. 288 One federal judge made an exception to his ruling forbidding racial segregation. He allowed patient
reassignment based on therapeutic, medical, or psychiatric considerations, as determined by a physician in the best interests of
a particular patient. 2 8 9 But another district court ruled that even
if white patients would be better off from a psychological point of
view in recuperating, the hospital could not segregate them.2 90
284

Thaxton v. Vaughan, 321 F.2d 474 (4th Cir. 1963). But see Wood v.

Vaughan, 209 F. Supp. 106 (W.D. Va. 1962), allowing segregation of

aged patients in a nursing home to preserve safety.
Pringle v. State Tuberculosis Bd., 11 RACE REL. L. REP. 1427 (U.S.D.C.,
N.D. Fla. 1966).
288 Burton v. Board of Trustees, 11 RACE REL. L. REP. 1933 (U.S.D.C.,
E.D. Ark. 1966).
287 Flagler Hospital, Inc. v. Hayling, 344 F.2d 950 (5th Cir. 1965); Rackley
285

v. Orangeburg Regional Hospital, 310 F.2d 141 (4th Cir. 1962); Rogers
v. Druid City Hospital, 10 RACE REL. L. REP. 1273 (U.S.D.C., N.D.
Ala. 1965); Lewter v. Lee Memorial Hospital, 11 RACE REL. L. REP.
1425 (U.S.D.C., M.D. Fla. 1965); Batts v. Duplin General Hospital, 11
RACE REL. L. REP. 1427 (U.S.D.C., E.D.N.C. 1965).
288

Wood v. Hogan, 215 F. Supp. 53 (W.D. Va. 1963).

289

Rax v. State Dept. of Hospitals, 11 RACE RE.. L. RE. 384 (U.S.D.C.,
E.D. La. 1965).
Rackley v. Board of Trustees, 238 F. Supp. 512, 518-19 (E.D.S.C.
1965): "[D]efendants asserted strongly that there were sound medical
reasons for separating the patients by race when they were admitted
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This view has not gone without criticism. One federal judge
remarked:
I am convinced that no sufficient showing has been made to warrant the issuance of an order of injunction interfering with the
operation of a hospital which should be in the hands of those competent to operate it. The health-even the lives-of individuals
could be endangered by a non-expert effort to operate a hospital
upon sociological or social considerations rather than considerations of health. The health of a community is of vastly more importance than where some non-patient shall sit while waiting on a
public or private conveyance.... Whatever there is of controversy
concerns the adult plaintiffs complaint that she was asked to
move from the seat which she apparently had selected after making an inspection of seating facilities. That seems to have been
the center of her interest at the hospital, not the treatment of her
daughter's injured finger.... This is an action based.., on the
claim that the defendants violated the civil rights of the plaintiffs
by not allowing them to select their seats while waiting for some

outsider to come for them after the hospitalization was terminated.
Assuming that the Hospital accepted gifts from the United States
(a world-wide practice), it provided no support
for the assertion
29
that plaintiffs' civil rights were violated. '
In Cypress v. Newport News General & Nonsectarian Hospital
Ass'n,292 a majority of the Fourth Circuit asserted that any racial
segregation by a government-aided hospital was a violation of the
Constitution. The majority approved segregation based on almost
any other grounds, but forbade racial segregation. No reason why
it was unconstitutional was given.293 But in a dissent, Judge Bryan
declared:
to the hospital. The principal thrust of this argument.., was that the
patients, in their normal lives, were 'comfortable' in a segregated
society, and because they would be more sensitive and otherwise
'disoriented' as they were away from home and loved ones while in
a hospital receiving treatment, they should be allowed to be assigned
to beds in proximity to members of their own race. This court does
not question the argument that psychological factors are an important
element of patient recovery. Psychological factors are important to
all citizens.... However, it is clearly established that governmental
officers and agents cannot practice racial segregation."
291 Rackley v. Board of Trustees, 7 RACE REL. L. REP. 837 (U.S.D.C.,
E.D.S.C. 1962).
292 375 F.2d 648 (4th Cir. 1967).
293 See id. at 656-57, where the court said: "In a colloquy with plaintiffs'
counsel, the District Judge asked whether it was 'discrimination per se
merely because a hospital has deemed fit to place white patients in
one ward, Negro patients in another ward?' We answer that it is.
Any distinction made on the basis of race in a publicly-supported
institution is a patent violation of the law, not to be tolerated by a
court that is controlled by the constitution of the United States....
[R]ace cannot be a factor in the admission, assignment, classification
or treatment of patients in an institution like this, which is state-
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I think the opinion should contain an acknowledgement of the
necessity in certain instances of varying the assignment rule laid
down by the Court, that is something in the following sense: If in
the judgment of the attending or hospital physician or surgeon,
it would be detrimental to the recovery of a patient, because of his
actual though unfounded prejudice, to be placed or remain in a
ward or room with a patient of another race, then the hospital by
removing the objecting patient to another ward or room will not
contravene the equality of treatment enjoined in this opinion.
...Such intimately personal considerations are left to the decision
of those skilled in the healing arts and particularly sensible to
the feelings of the sick person.294
The Brown opinion is premised, at least ostensibly, on psychological considerations. It is difficult to understand why the psychic
makeup of a white patient is not as precious in the eyes of the law
as the alleged inferiority feelings of the Negro patients. The federal
courts have never even attempted to develop a coherent rationale
for banning segregation in hospitals. They have relied on ipse
diximus. But such pronouncements are hardly satisfactory. Their
efficacy to force desegregation on patients in hospitals cannot be

disputed. Patients have little choice but to stay in a hospital, for,
by definition, if they were well enough to leave they would go
home. They are helpless to resist, and too ill or disabled to leave.
Thus, a hospital differs from a recreational facility, which one may
forego. The denial of freedom of choice is doubly grave because
the patient is a captive. The federal courts have offered no adequate
justification for such denial.
D. OTHER GovERNVaENTAL FAcILITIs

As a matter of administrative policy, this author could never
understand any good reason for maintaining racially segregated
toilets, drinking fountains, or other sanitary facilities. Presumably,
use should be made of them by those whose needs, at the moment,
are greatest, and any duplication of facilities ought to go to reducing the waiting time of persons in need of public sanitary conveniences. But the most efficient use of lavatories and water fountains can best be determined by somebody at the level of building
janitor or park supervisor. One would have thought that there are
some things, such as the place where water is drunk or liquid and
solid wastes are eliminated, which are too trivial to be covered by
the United States Constitution. To this author, it seems somewhat

204

supported and receives federal funds. Room assignments may be
made with due regard to sex, age, type of illness, or other relevant
factors, but racial distinctions are impermissible, since the law forbids
the treatment of individuals differently or separately because of their
race, color, or national origin."
Id. at 661.
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incongruous for federal judges to be spending their time inquiring
into the precise location of water fountains, urinals, and toilet
bowls.
Nevertheless, it has been repeatedly held that segregation in
drinking fountains and toilets violates the equal protection clause
of the fourteenth amendment. 295 Why a person is less well protected if he drinks at one fountain rather than another, or uses one
bowl instead of a different bowl, mystifies this author. Applying
Brown to drinking fountains and toilets seems to be running the
theory of psychological inferiority into the ground. At least one
federal judge has taken this view.29 6 He said:

The reasoning is that members of the Negro race should not be
precluded from associating with members of other races when it
tends to deprive them of the opportunity of enjoying facilities
which should be common to all, and from which the Negro will
benefit equally with others. To assign this logic to the use of toilet
facilities admittedly
equal is, in the opinion of the Court, a bit
far-fetched. 297
295 Smith v. City of Birmingham, 8 RACE REL. L. REP. 1566 (U.S.D.C.,
N.D. Ala. 1963); Freeman v. City of Little Rock, 8 RACE REL. L. REP.
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173 (U.S.D.C., E.D. Ark. 1963); United States v. City of Montgomery,
201 F. Supp. 590 (M.D. Ala. 1962); Bohler v. Lane, 204 F. Supp.
168 (S.D. Fla. 1962); Robinson v. Board of Supervisors, 11 RACE REL.
L. REP. 1423 (U.S.D.C., S.D. Miss. 1965); Turner v. Randolph, 195
F. Supp. 677 (W.D. Tenn. 1961). See also Jones v. Marva Theatres,
Inc., 180 F. Supp. 49 (D. Md. 1960).
Dawley v. City of Norfolk, 159 F. Supp. 642, 648 (E.D. Va. 1958):
"[I]t is suggested that the 'separate but equal doctrine may still
exist with respect to public rest rooms. It is certainly true that if
anything remains of this doctrine, it could be upheld in a case such
as presented herein. The underlying reasons for the rejection of the
'separate but equal' doctrine would not appear to be applicable to
toilet facilities.... It may well be that the maintenance of separate
but equal toilet facilities for the races falls within the classification
of a reasonable rule and regulation, particularly where the courthouse itself is available to all races. Certainly it could not be argued
that the water closets reserved for the two judges should be made

available to the general public merely because of the principle of

297

law above stated."
Id. at 646, n.3. See also id. at 645: "Irrespective of the wisdom of maintaining separate white and colored toilet facilities in a state courthouse, there is no more reason to suggest that judges deem Negro
attorneys inferior than there is to say that a white attorney is inferior
because he may use a rest room marked 'White'. In federal buildings
throughout Virginia, where separate facilities for colored and white
have generally been abolished, it in no sense increased or decreased
the prestige of any attorney in the mind of the judge or the public.
To say that there is a loss of earning power, or a denial of equal
protection of laws, or a denial under color of law of equality of treatment, would reduce the law to an absurdity."
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Another area into which the Brown decision has been extended
is courtroom segregation. This author believes that in most places
and situations segregation of spectators is not necessary. However,
some deference is due to the opinions of those whose duty it is to
keep order in court in determining whether such segregation is
necessary at any particular time and place. For example, an important case with strong racial overtones may engender such
racial antipathy in the audience that disturbances could break out.
Preventive segregation may be as wise a measure as the exclusion from the courtroom of spectators when particularly lurid
testimony is being given. The people on the spot can probably
make the best decision.
Courtroom desegregation is a recent offspring of Brown. As
late as 1961 a federal judge showed marked impatience with the
argument that state judges were required to desegregate the
seating areas for spectators. 298 But in 1963, the Supreme Court
declared: "State-compelled segregation in a court of justice is a
manifest violation of the State's duty to deny no one the equal
298

Wells v. Gilliam, 196 F. Supp. 792, 794-95 (E.D. Va. 1961): "[T]He
plaintiffs contend there is no moral or legal justification requiring or
condoning segregated seats in the Municipal Court of the City of
Petersburg; that it is a mockery of justice and repugnant to the
Due Process Clause and Equal Protection Clause of the Constitution
of the United States; that it is degrading and shameful to permit
such a custom. That these allegations are totally without merit is
best evidenced by the fact the plaintiffs offered no evidence in support thereof. What rights, if any, the plaintiffs have as citizens of the
United States in self-determining where they may sit in the Municipal
court room of the City of Petersburg, have not been delineated with
any degree of clarity. If they have the right to determine where they
sit, they have the right to applaud, the right to take pictures, and
many other similar rights; carried to the extreme, proper court room
decorum and order would be non-existent. The evidence in this case
establishes beyond question that the practice and custom complained
of has been directed and enforced by every judge occupying the
bench of that court; that the reason therefor is to preserve order
and decorum and to assure the orderly administration of justice to
all, regardless of race or color. There is no allegation or offer of proof
that the order complained of is not being enforced equally among
all citizens regardless of race or color. Whether other courts of
Virginia deem it necessary or unnecessary to promulgate a similar
order is immaterial. Suffice it to say, it has recently been necessary
for a Virginia court to clear the court room of all spectators in order
to maintain decorum and order.
"That a judge has control of his court room and the conduct of
those attending this court is axiomatic. Indeed, it is a power inherent
in any court. In the administration of justice, the judge is charged
with the preservation of order and to see to it that justice is not obstructed by any person or persons whatever."
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protection of the laws. '299 The Court did not trouble itself to explain
who was being denied equal protection of the laws by spectator
segregation, or how it was being denied. For example, if both plaintiff and defendant were white, who was being denied equal protection by segregating the races in the courtroom? The parties seemed
equally protected, and the spectators were not being tried. No elucidation of this was given. The ruling came down as another bolt
of lightning out of the sky.
The Supreme Court of Alabama has tried to mitigate the effect
of this ruling by deciding that voluntary courtroom segregation
was still permissible. 0° It has also been held that a court may keep
its files and records on a segregated basis. 801 At least the argument
that the file jackets will develop an inferiority complex has not yet
found favor with the federal judges.
The federal courts have also held that reform schools have to
be desegregated. 30 2 Even though reform schools are penal institutions, the federal courts have relied on Brown for the proposition
that separate reform schools are inherently unequal. 8°0 It has also
been held that if a white prisoner is allowed to read a "white"
newspaper, a black prisoner must be allowed to read a "black"
newspaper; otherwise there is unconstitutional discrimination based
on the race and color of the prisoner. 0 4 Why this is so is not readily
apparent. A newspaper has no race; and typically its color is black
ink on white paper, a matter of no constitutional significance. As
for discrimination regarding the type of reading matter, this has
nothing to do with the race of the prisoner. A Negro might want
to read a "white" newspaper such as the New York Times and a
white prisoner might want to read a Negro magazine. This is just
another of the weird extentions of Brown.
As for prisons themselves, Brown has been a late arrival. As
late as 1963, one federal judge held that it would be unconstituJohnson v. Virginia, 373 U.S. 61, 62 (1963). Accord, Wood v. Vaughan,
321 F.2d 480 (4th Cir. 1963); Bevel v. Mallory, 11 RAcE REr.. L. REP.
1422 (U.S.D.C., S.D. Ala. 1966).
300 Howard v. State, 278 Ala. 361, 178 So.2d 520 (1965).
801 Robinson v. Board of Supervisors, 11 RAcE REL. L. REP. 1423, 1424
(U.S.D.C., S.D. Miss. 1965): 'Itcannot be easily conceived as to any
possible right of anyone of these plaintiffs that could be or is infringed
by the method in which these justices of the peace keep their records,
even though they may designate or identify them as colored. It is
a tenuous claim indeed that would contend that any vested rights of
the plaintiffs are impinged upon by either such practices and this
Court holds that they are not violated."
302 Singleton v. Board of Conm'rs, 356 F.2d 771 (5th Cir. 1966).
303 Board of Managers v. George, 377 F.2d 228 (8th Cir. 1967).
804 Rivers v. Royster, 360 F.2d 592 (4th Cir. 1966).
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tional to order integration of a white prison dormitory.30 5 Another
federal court in California ruled that racial segregation in prisons
was not unconstitutional, saying: "By no parity of reasoning can
the rationale of Brown v. Board of Education, supra, be extended
to State penal institutions where the inmates, and their control,
pose difficulties not found in educational systems."30 6 In Bolden v.
Pegelow,30 7 the district court ruled that a prison inmate has no
constitutional right to use either a white or colored barbershop,
and was not discriminated against when white inmates were directed to the white barbers and colored inmates were directed to
colored barbers. However, the Fourth Circuit relied on Brown to
hold prison barbershop segregation unconstitutional.
More recent lower court cases have held that racial segregation
in prisons is unconstitutional. 8 s A good example of this view is
contained in Edwards v. Sard.30 9 In this case, a Negro inmate sued
to enjoin racial segregation of dormitories in Lorton. The prison
contained 1,100 Negroes and 110 whites. Of the twenty-two dormitories, six were integrated, the assignments being made by a Negro
deputy superintendent. Racial considerations were among the factors considered in an overall security picture.
The court applied Brown to prisons, holding that "since full
racial integration is invariably a desirable goal, racial discrimination may be seen as any unjustifiable delay in achieving this
goal."3 10 It added:
By assigning members of the white minority exclusively to the
six integrated dormitories, the effect is of necessity to restrict the
opportunity of some members of the Negro majority group to live
in these six dormitories. In addition, the effect is obviously to
reduce the likelihood that any given Negro inmate will be able
to reside in integrated housing.3 1'
The court declared that the prison authorities "indicated a sincere awareness of the desirability of achieving the greatest possible
intermingling of the races consistent with the security of the insti-

Dixon v. Duncan, 218 F. Supp. 157 (E.D. Va. 1963).
Nichols v. McGee, 169 F. Supp. 721, 724 (N.D. Calif. 1959), appeal
denied, 361 U.S. 6 (1959).
307 218 F. Supp. 152 (E.D. Va. 1963), rev'd, 329 F.2d 95 (4th Cir. 1964).
308 Washington v. Lee, 263 F. Supp. 327 (M.D. Ala. 1966), aff'd, 390 U.S.
333 (1968); Jackson v. City Comm'n, 11 RACE REL. L. REP. 1436
(U.S.D.C., S.D. Fla. 1965).
309 250 F. Supp. 977 (D.D.C. 1966).
310 Id. at 979.
311 Id. at 979.
305
306
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tution,'

3 12
.
but that security factors prevented complete integration.
The court observed:

Although analogies to instances of previous judicial intervention
to prevent racial discrimination in schools, housing, recreational
facilities, and employment may seem at first inviting, upon careful
scrutiny the Court is convinced that the differences between these
areas and prisons are far more significant than are the similarities.
The association between men in correctional institutions is closer
and more fraught with physical danger and psychological pressures
than is almost any other kind of association between human beings.
Moreover, a great many of the inmates of correctional institutions
are dangerous men, and those charged with supervising them
understandably have less confidence in their ability to adapt peacefully to changed social conditions than one would have in men
who reside in society at large. The operation of penal institutions
is a highly specialized endeavor, and the sober judgment of
experienced correctional personnel deserves the most careful consideration by the courts.313
Applying these considerations, the court concluded that complete
integration was being achieved as quickly as possible consistent
with security factors. However, the court ruled that if integration
was ever dropped as a goal in Lorton, the plaintiff could reinstitute
3 14
his suit.
312

313
314

Id. at 980. The court quoted from a prison report as follows: "We
believe that there is an advantage to both races if there can be interracial mixing to the extent that this can be done, and maintain the
security and safety of the institution.... [W] e feel... [intermingling
of races] has a socializing effect on that individual. Many of our
Negroes are from the southern states and have never before lived
in an integrated situation. We believe that there is a benefit to them
to be exposed to this. We would like very much to have every dormitory we have integrated if we had a sufficient proportion of white to
Negro to do this safely. " Id. at 980 & n. 8. See, however, N.Y. Times,
Sept. 12, 1968, at 31, col. 4, setting forth homosexual gang rapes on
white prisoners by Negroes in Philadelphia jails. A report by the
Philadelphia District Attorney's office said that racial tensions played
a part in these rapes.
Id. at 981.
Id. at 981-82, where the court declared: "Although the race of an
inmate is a factor-in some cases the determinative factor-in making
dormitory assignments, this is so only because prison officials believe
that anything approaching total numerical integration would be highly
dangerous, given the conditions of racial unrest which exist at Lorton,
and that the racial conflicts which would result from such integration
would be likely to decrease instead of increase the intermingling of
races there. The dangers of prison life, the extreme complexity of the
factors which must be considered in making dormitory assignments,
and the consequent difficulties in handing down any decree favoring
the plaintiffs in this case confirm the court's belief that safety and
sound administrative practice demand that the opinions of conscientious prison supervisors be given great respect when challenges of
this kind are made to them."
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The Supreme Court has now ruled that prisons must be desegregated just like other facilities. Once again its cryptic, per curiam
s 15
opinion sets forth no rationale.
However, taking the question of prison integration from a
general viewpoint, it seems that application of Brown is an exercise in illogical thinking from beginning to end. To start with, the
"separate-but-equal" doctrine has no application to prisons since
the only facilities prisoners are entitled to are high walls and
strong bars. A Negro prisoner can hardly complain that the walls
of the white prisons are higher and the bars are stronger. The
prison authorities are entitled to confine him wherever they think
best. Hence, if his prison is inferior in its physical plant, it is no
cause for complaint, and if segregation results in psychologically
inferior quarters, it is also no cause for complaint. There is no such
thing as a legal right to prison amenities since prison is not a
hotel but rather a place where the prisoner is being punished. As
prisoners have no legal standing to complain that someone else's
punishment is less severe than their punishment, they have no
standing to complain that their amenities are fewer than someone
else's amenities. The risk of more severe punishment is a normal
risk of committing a crime and serves as a good deterrent to criminals. Every person has it in his own power, by refraining from
crime, to avoid prison entirely.
On the other hand, here is one area where freedom of choice in
association by white prisoners is not involved. By being sentenced
to prison, the convict loses his freedom of choice along with other
aspects of his liberty. Indeed, the courts may decide to punish
segregationists who commit crimes by placing them with Negro
prisoners. This is a perfectly legitimate punishment since they have
lost their liberty and such punishment may serve as an added
deterrent.
It is ironic that prison is the only place in which racial segregation will sometimes still be tolerated by the federal courts. A person
has to commit a crime to obtain liberty of association on a governmental facility. The application of Brown to prisons has resulted in
an absurdity in which the law-abiding citizens have lost their free-

315

"This decision is rendered on the basis of current practices at
Lorton. Should it appear in the future, however near, that through
passage of time or change in circumstances sufficient efforts are no
longer being made at Lorton to achieve the maximum integration of
the races consistent with the security of the institution, nothing would
prevent the question raised in this case from being reopened."
Washington v. Lee, 263 F. Supp. 327 (M.D. Ala. 1966), aff'd, 390 U.S.
333 (1968).
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dom. of choice in association while the criminals may still be segregated if they so desire and if it will help keep the peace. Committing a crime is an odd way of fighting for liberty, but this is the
end result of federal court decisions.
The federal courts have drawn the same distinction between
desegregation and integration in respect to government facilities
that they have in respect to schools. 316 They have declared that
public facilities need not be integrated, but need only be desegregated,31 7 and that if after desegregation Negroes continue to use
Negro facilities and white persons continue to use white facilities,
this is not unconstitutional. 31 8 As one federal judge said: "Voluntary
segregation does not violate the Constitution of the United States
which does not prohibit a municipality from permitting, authorizing, or encouraging voluntary segregation."31 9
Now, however, that the Fifth Circuit has just abolished the
distinction between school desegregation and school integration,
and held that all southern schools must be integrated,3 20 it remains
to be seen how long this distinction will be permitted to last in
respect to government facilities. Perhaps the controversy over
racial imbalance in the schools will have its counterpart in respect
to other facilities. As the Lorton situation shows, jails create a
particular problem of racial imbalance. The only solution will be to
incarcerate a given number of white persons, selected at random
every year from the population, who have not committed any
crime, to keep the jails racially balanced.

316 See

Avins, Towards Freedom of Choice in Education, 45 J. URBAN L.

23 (1967).

Shuttlesworth v. Gaylord, 202 F. Supp. 59, 62 (N.D. Ala. 1961):
"Though so referred to in public discussion, this action is not one to
compel integration of the public facilities herein involved. The law
does not compel integration, whatever the guise under which relief
issought. Itonly prohibits governmentally enforced segregation."
318 See Robinson v. City of Fairfield, 11 RACE REL. L. REP. 909 (N.D.Ala.
1965): "Negroes now have the full use of these facilities if they desire
to use the same. The fact that not many are using the facilities cannot
be laid to any fault or discrimination on the part of the defendants.
The use of the facilities is now a matter of individual choice. Having
desegregated the same, there is no affirmative duty on the part of
the City or its officials to enter upon a campaign of dissuasion for a
lesser use of the former 'Negro' facilities by Negroes, or of persuasion
for a greater use of the former 'white' facilities by them."
319 Clark v. Thompson, 7 RACE REL. L. REP. 558, 559 (U.S.D.C., S.D.
Miss. 1962).
320 United States v. Jefferson County Bd. of Educ., 372 F.2d 836 (5th
Cir. 1966).
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V. FREEDOM OF CHOICE
Does the drive during the current era for compulsory integration in places of public and private accommodation infringe
on the right of freedom of choice in association? In this author's
opinion, it does. The reason for this is well stated in an opinion of
the Court of Appeals of Kentucky which is worth quoting at some
length:
It is obvious that the rights attempted to be secured in this case
are social and not political; that plaintiff seeks to commingle with
the members of the white race in the enjoyment of summer opera
and to play golf with white persons in a park set aside for the use
of members of the white race. To grant the relief which the plaintiff seeks would compel white persons to associate with colored
persons, whether it were to their pleasure or not. This would be
an infringement on the rights of white persons who would object
to being compelled to commingle with colored persons. This in
no way is a reflection on the members of the colored race, for they
have among their number many who have honored their race by
their contribution to the higher arts and sciences; but the realistic
fact remains, 'like attracts like,' and it is just plain human nature
for persons of the same tastes and desires, whether they be black
or white, to associate together for the purpose of enjoying themselves to the best advantage. That fact accounts for the separate
strata of society even among members of the same race. People
move in circles wherein they are likely to be suited or matched.
If it were possible to grant the plaintiff the social relief he seeks,
where should the line be drawn? Should one in another stratum of
society other than the one in which the plaintiff moves in his own
race, whether it be on a higher or a lower level than his own,
demand the same relief and this Court grant it, could it be assumed
that the strata would by court action be eliminated? It would
merely result in one stratum moving in and the other out. So in
the natural course of events, should the white race be compelled
to accept into the enjoyment of its parks and amphitheater with
all of its recreational facilities, the members of the colored race,
and the white race move out and the colored race possess it, the
net result would be that the right to the enjoyment of parks would
be denied to the white race; and the process would be continued
ad infinitum.
Social equality between persons of the white and colored races,
or in fact between persons of the same race, cannot be enforced by
legislation or by the courts, nor can the voluntary association of
persons of different races, or persons of the same race, be constitutionally prohibited by legislation or the courts, unless such association is shown to be immoral, disorderly, or for some other reason
so palpably injurious to the public welfare as to justify a direct
interference with the personal liberty of the citizen.321
The issue of whether any particular form of integration constitutes a violation of freedom of choice in association, and there321

Sweeney v. City of Louisville, 309 Ky. 465, 475-76, 218 S.W.2d 30,
35-36 (1949).
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fore an unfair practice for the owner or other person who controls
or manages a place of public or private accommodation to engage
in, cannot be decided without first establishing that someone
objects to such integration who has a substantial interest in the
matter. Obviously, a person is not entitled to walk in off of the
streets and claim that a business should change its policy to conform
to his notions of conducting its affairs. Before even considering
whether a claim of denial of freedom of association is valid, the
person objecting to integration should have some interest in the
matter.
People who are interested in whether a facility integrates fall
into two main categories, employees and customers or others who
use its facilities. Employees may include a proprietor or partner
working actively in the business, if he comes in contact with those
who use the facilities. Volunteer workers, as, for instance, in a
charity, have a sufficient interest to be classified as employees.
The other category of people who are interested in new people
using a facility are those who already use it. These may be customers of a paying facility, whether profit making or nonprofit or
beneficiaries of a charity. For example, charity patients of a hospital, even though they pay nothing, still are interested in who
shares their room.
A habitual user of a facility also has an interest in who else is
being admitted to the facility even though he is not using it at the
time of admission. For example, a person who has a season ticket
to a swimming pool is interested in who else is being admitted to
the pool even though he is not using it at the time of admission,
since he may use it later when the new customer uses it. Likewise,
a person who habitually stays in a resort every year is interested
in new patronage which might change its character although he has
not yet made his reservation for the new season.
Finally, a potential user for whom the accommodations, facilities, or services were specially designed, is also interested in integration thereof. For instance, if a man buys a cemetery plot, it
can reasonably be anticipated that when he dies his children will
come to visit his grave. The children are therefore potential visitors
at the cemetery for which the facilities of the cemetery have been
specially designed, for their coming is reasonably probable, though
delayed. They are therefore interested in who else buys a plot in
the same cemetery even though their father is still alive and they
do not go to the cemetery at all. If a trust were set up to run a
summer camp for blind children of a certain locality, these children
would be potential users for whom the camp was specially designed
and would be interested in who else was admitted to the camp
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even though they had not yet reached the age when they could,
under the terms of the trust, take advantage of the camp's facilities.
It is not enough that an objector have an interest in who else
is using the facility. That interest must be substantial. In other
words, use of the accommodation, facility, or services must substantially impinge on his associational preferences. What a substantial infringement is can only be determined by circumstances,
and differs depending on the type of facility. Nevertheless, some
broad outlines can be suggested.
First, the period of time during which the persons are thrown
together is a significant factor in determining whether associational
interests are important. For example, persons who sit next to each
other on a crowded city bus or subway for a half hour ride to work
or home are unlikely to want to socialize with each other. Likewise,
standees in a rush-hour vehicle, although packed together like sardines, typically treat each other impersonally, like part of the woodwork. In such a case, association is virtually nonexistent and riders
have, in the usual situation, no substantial interest in who else is
on the bus or subway. On the other hand, passengers on a long
distance bus ride for several days often seek out somebody congenial to converse with to pass the time. In such a case, they have
a substantial interest in who is sitting next to them.
Secondly, whether the activity is functional or recreational will
have a bearing on the legitimacy of associational preferences. A
person waiting in line in a bank or post office hardly has much
real interest in who is waiting ahead of him or behind him. On
the other hand, one who goes for a vacation to a resort, camp,
swimming pool, or similar establishment has an interest in having
vacationers with similar interests so that he can enjoy his vacation
in activities with those of like preferences.
Proximity and personal contact may also be important, especially in the case of employees whose associational preferences are
in issue. A taxi driver has more of an interest in who his passengers
are than an airline pilot. A nurse, barber, or a professional man is
more interested in the client, customer, or patient, than a movie
theater owner who sells a ticket to see a film. Patrons of a zoo,
museum, or library have less contact with other patrons than
patients at a hospital; hence they have less of an interest in who
the other person is.
Even if the associational interest of the user of the facility is
substantial, that in itself does not mean that the facility should not
integrate over his objection. His interests must be weighed against
the interests of the owner. The principal interest of an owner of
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a private business is economic. Under a free enterprise system, he
desires to make a profit and is entitled to make the largest profit
his skill and capital will bring him. To make a profit he must fill
his facilities and utilize his labor force in the most efficient manner
possible. To serve his economic interests, the owner or manager of
an enterprise is entitled to take any customer he can get and to
arrange them in order to maximize return and minimize costs.
The associational interests of both employees and other customers
must yield to this interest. If they do not choose to associate with
those persons whom the economic interests of the business dictate
be accommodated, both employees and dissatisfied customers can
change to a business with a policy more to their liking. However,
if the business takes new customers, not to serve its financial ends
but simply to force existing customers or employees to associate
with these new people, that is unfair in this author's view.
The same principle applies to non-profit institutions. They are
likewise entitled to run in the most efficient manner possible. For
instance, a hospital is entitled to fill all of its beds since this lowers
its cost per bed. A patient who objects to new people being brought
in, when these are the only new patients available to fill vacant
beds, cannot expect to have his associational interests, however
substantial they may be, prevail over the hospital's needs.
Another principle should be that a facility may invite new
persons to use it over the objection of one who has a substantial
associational interest in the matter, if the addition is directly related
to the basic purpose for which the facility was set up. For example,
if a camp is specifically founded to bring together persons of different religions, a vacationer cannot object to its carrying out its
purpose. Likewise, museums, libraries, orchestras, opera, and similar cultural centers are typically designed to spread culture through
a whole community. This requires that they be open to all, and
one who uses it can hardly complain that others whom he does
not care to associate with use it also. In addition, some churches
are set up on a parish system, and all adherents of the faith in the
parish are required to belong to one church. In such a church, no
member could object to another resident of the parish on associational grounds. Of course, this does not apply to congregational
churches.
Finally, public utilities are typically required to serve the whole
public as a condition of obtaining a monopoly franchise. A customer
can hardly complain about service rendered to another customer,
any more than the latter can object to the former. Both must be
accommodated or, for want of competition, neither will find alternate services available.
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The fact that there are valid reasons for the refusal of a business
or other facility to honor an objection by one who is substantially
affected in his freedom of choice in association to the entry of a
new user of the facility does not mean that the objection ought to
be ignored entirely. The owner or manager of the facility should
exercise reasonable diligence and take appropriate steps to go as
far as he can in satisfying the objector and still carry out the legitimate interests of the facility. In other words, keeping in mind the
overriding interests of the business or institution, the owner or
manager should so arrange the facility as to afford the largest
measure of freedom of choice in association consistent with this
prime interest which makes it impossible to satisfy the objector
entirely.
For example, a public utility such as a bus company has to
serve all persons equally. It therefore cannot satisfy a Democrat
who objects to a Republican taking the bus. But if two Democrats
want to sit next to each other it can arrange, when loading the
bus, to place them side-by-side. As a matter of efficiency, it may be
impossible to poll passengers for their preferences. Nevertheless,
if there are two empty, adjoining seats and the two Democrats
ask to be seated together, it would be a denial of freedom of choice
in association for the bus company to deliberately separate them
without a good business reason.
Another example might be a college tennis court which was
built especially as an athletic facility for use by all of the students
at a particular college. In such a case, a student from a prominent
family who objected that sons of factory workers were using the
court could hardly expect to have his objection honored since such
poorer students were equally in the group for whom the court was
built. But if students were permitted to reserve the court, the college would be bound to honor a request that the court be reserved
for the prominent student and his three student friends in the
social register. His desire not to play with others of a lower economic class could be satisfied consistently with the basic purpose
for which the court was built and it would be a denial of freedom
of choice in association to force him to play with poorer students.
Similarly, a hospital might have decided to take all applicants
without regard to race to fill up its facilities. A white patient's objection to admission of Negroes need not, therefore, be honored. But
if two white patients wished to be placed in semi-private rooms
with white patients, it would be a denial of freedom of choice to
refuse to put both of them in the same room and to deliberately
place each in a room with a Negro. Likewise, a restaurant which
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accepts all business in order to earn more money does not deny
freedom of choice in association. But if four white people want to
sit together at the same table it would infringe on their liberty to
separate them solely for the sake of integration.
Many of the foregoing standards have been violated in the
current era because of the mandates of federal or state laws, the
directives of governmental integration commissions or other departments of government engaged in bringing about integration, or
because of pressure by private groups such as churches and universities which put integration clauses in their contracts. It should
be considered an unfair practice for either a governmental agency
or a private organization to compel or persuade the owner or manager of a business or non-profit facility to force integration on the
employees or those people using the facility. They are entitled to
freedom of choice in association free from such third-party pressure on those with whom they deal. No penalties should be allowed
to be inflicted on businesses or institutions which permit freedom
of choice therein, or on persons who actually exercise such freedom
of choice.A
322

If it were necessary to put the concept of freedom of choice in business in the form of a rule or regulation, the following form may prove
satisfactory:
A. It is an unfair business practice for the owner, lessee, or other
person in control of any place of public or private accommodation,
to extend the use of such accommodation, its facilities, or services, to
any person, when any employee or existing user, habitual user, or
potential user for whom such accommodation, facilities or services,
were specially designed, and who has a substantial interest in whom
the person objected to is, objects, and
(i) The extension of such use is not made for economic reasons,
and
(ii) The extension of such use does not directly relate to the basic
purpose for which the facilities or services were established, and
(iii) In the case of a public utility, the extension of such use is
not necessary to provide required public service.
B. Should an objector specified in this section object, and should
parts (i), (ii), or (iii), or any of them not be true, then it is an
unfair business practice to extend to use of such accommodations,
services, or facilities, only insofar as such place of accommodation
or agency has failed to exercise reasonable diligence and take appropriate steps to satisfy such objector insofar as this may be done
consistently with due regard to the factors enumerated in such parts.
C. The above considerations are relevant to institutional housing.
D. It is an unfair practice for any governmental agency, institution,
corporation, organization, association, or person, to compel, coerce,
direct, influence, or persuade another to commit any unfair business
practice, or to subject any person, organization, association, corporation, institution, or agency to any detriment or disadvantage for
exercising his or its freedom of choice or allowing another to do so.
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The considerations relevant to freedom of choice in governmental facilities are very similar to those which should be operative
in public utilities. Governmental agencies should take into account
the preferences of both their employees and of those who use the
facilities or for whom the facilities were especially designed, if the
use by others will in fact impinge on associational preferences. If
no associational interests are substantially affected, the question
of freedom of choice does not arise. For example, people waiting
in line to take a driving test do not have any interest in who else
is waiting in line. On the other hand, people in quarantine for
extended periods would have a strong interest in who their companions were.
Since all citizens are equally obliged to support government
by taxes or personal activity such as military service, the various
layers of government in turn must treat all citizens alike and must
extend equal facilities and services to everyone in the relevant
group, class, or area, who is similarly situated. Since the distinctions
drawn between those who will receive the benefit of government
facilities and services and those who will not must be relevant to
the facilities and services provided, the associational preferences of
employees and users of the facilities and services must be a subordinate consideration. For example, if there is one municipal library, everybody is entitled to use it and no class of residents may
be excluded therefrom even if some other class does not want to
be sitting next to them in the library. The only time that freedom
of choice is infringed is if a government facility integrates simply
for the purpose of forcing existing users of the facility to associate
with other persons they find disagreeable.
Extension of facilities to all persons may be required to carry
out the basic purpose for which the facilities were established.
For example, a sports competition designed to allow all participants in that sport to compete against each other would be frustrated if one competitor had the right to bar another competitor
from the facility. In addition, the objection of an interested employee or user cannot be heeded if to do so will materially impede
the administration of the facility or the program of the agency.
The first duty of government is to operate its facilities efficiently
and economically and thus to reduce the tax burden on taxpayers.
If it is necessary to infringe on associational preferences to operate
a government facility with maximum efficiency or to produce
maximum services for the expense incurred, then these preferences
must be subordinated to the need for efficiency and economy in
government. Military service is a good example of a governmental
agency in which associational preferences must typically be ignored
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to avoid chaos. But even in the military, if integration is carried
out beyond that necessary for maximum efficiency, so that it
becomes an end in itself, it is a violation of freedom of choice in
association in respect to those who object to it.
From the foregoing, it is clear that freedom of choice in association has only a minimal scope insofar as exclusion from government facilities is concerned. However, it is of major importance in
respect to arrangement of persons using governmental facilities.
When a person whose substantial associational interests will be
infringed by the use of a governmental facility objects, and because
of some overriding consideration the facility should be made available to all notwithstanding the objection, as will typically be the
case, the facility should exercise reasonable diligence and take
appropriate steps to satisfy the interests of the objector insofar as
this can be done without contravening some legitimate, overriding
government policy unrelated to forcing association on the objector.
In other words, where freedom of association cannot be preserved
completely, it should be preserved as far as possible. Typically, this
can be effectuated by allowing the objector and others of like persuasion to segregate themselves on a portion of the facility allocated to them.
For example, a government hospital containing rooms, each
with four beds, must serve all patients in the community. Should
a Protestant patient object to anyone but Protestants entering
the hospital this objection could not be acted on. But if there were
four such patients, they could all be put together in the same
room, thereby, as far as possible, satisfying their associational interests. If the hospital separated them and moved each one into a
room with Roman Catholics and Jews, not because of the requirements of efficiency or better medical treatment, but solely to force
integration on them, it would violate their freedom of choice, notwithstanding the fact that this was a government hospital.
Another illustration might be a municipal handball court which
could only accommodate four players. If a group of veterans demanded that no anti-war protestors be allowed to play in the court
this request could not be complied with since everyone is entitled
to equal use of the facility. But if the veterans objected to playing
with the anti-war demonstrators, the park authorities could give
all the veterans who wanted to play one appointment for the court
and give the demonstrators a different time to use the court. This
would constitute reasonable diligence and appropriate steps to
satisfy the associational interests of the veterans consistent with
the rights of the anti-war advocates.
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Allowing the exercise of freedom of choice in association on
government facilities should not be deemed unconstitutional government-enforced segregation. The vital difference is that the
individuals involved, and not the government, make the choice.
The element of government compulsion is therefore absent. Government simply provides the facilities and stands neutral as to
how the individuals desire to'use them. It is true that no one may
associate with another on government facilities over the objection
of the latter but this is true generally. Freedom of choice therefore
constitutes an exercise on government facilities of a general liberty
of all citizens. By being enabled to exercise such freedom on government facilities, the liberty of citizens is enlarged and regimentation is that much reduced.
It is no answer to say that by allotting facilities to any particular
class in accordance with the wishes of the individuals involved
the government aids or abets self-segregation. The capacity of all
facilities is limited and no two people can occupy the exact same
space at the same time. For example, no two people can sit on the
same seat in a municipal auditorium or lie on the same stretch of
sand in a state beach at the same moment. The rights of all to
occupy that seat, sand, or other area are exactly equal. As between
two exactly equal rights to occupy the same portion of a facility,
it is perfectly legitimate for government to allow two people to
occupy the facility next to each other, who want to be next to each
other, instead of allowing one person to inflict himself on an
unwilling neighbor. The former enlarges the liberty of both persons;
the latter restricts the freedom of non-association of one in order
to permit another to commit an unjustified social aggression. As
long as it is the individuals, and not government, which makes
the choice, government should be able to provide the means by
which the choice may be effective.823
323

Should freedom of choice in government facilities be formalized in
a rule or regulation, the following form can be suggested:
A. It is an unfair governmental practice for any governmental
agency engaged in the extension of facilities or rendition of services
to extend the use of such facilities or services to any person when
any employee or existing user, habitual user, or potential user for
whom such facilities or services were especially designed, and who
has a substantial interest in who the person objected to is, objects,
and
(i) The extension of such use is not necessary to provide substantially equal treatment for all persons in the group, class, or area,
entitled to receive the benefit of equal services by virtue of being
similarly situated, and
(ii) The extension of such use does not directly relate to the
basic purpose for which the facilities or services were established,
and
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Authority exists to support the proposition that public agencies
may constitutionally permit people to segregate themselves on
public facilities. Thus it has been held that a city may make short
term leases to lessees sponsoring private meetings for members
and friends, if no racial discrimination is made as to the selection
of lessees or the terms of the leases.324 Likewise, a federal court has
ruled that even though the District of Columbia furnishes some
free space to a boys club and assigns some police officers to assist
in its operations, this does not make the club a government agency
required to accept Negroes.3 25 In one case where a boys club was
permitted to conduct athletic contests among its own members
for an hour or two on public facilities, a Maryland Circuit Court
held that such occasional use of these facilities did not require
desegregation of the club. The court ruled that as long as the facilities could be used by any organization regardless of the racial or
religious composition of its members, the use of the facilities by
an all-white organization was not unconstitutional. The court said:
A caricature of the situation sought by plaintiffs will demonstrate

that complete evenhandedness in the granting of use of this kind
of public facility may go beyond that which the plaintiffs may
have a Constitutional right to demand. Suppose a family of Negro
citizens were to apply to the Board of Education for permission
to use its grounds at a certain location for the purpose of having a
reunion and picnic. Should this application be denied because
there were no white members of the family?
Should the operator of a public golf course permitting the use
of the course for playing golf to a foursome consisting of members
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(iii) The failure to extend such use will not materially impede the
administration of the agency or its program.
B. Should an objector specified in this section object, and should
parts (i), (ii), or (iii), or any of them, not be true, then it is an
unfair governmental practice to extend the use of such accommodations, services, or facilities, only insofar as such place of accommodation or agency has failed to exercise reasonable diligence and take
appropriate steps to satisfy such objector insofar as this may be
done consistently with due regard to the factors enumerated in such
parts.
C. The above considerations are relevant to governmental housing.
Freeman v. City of Little Rock, 8 RACE REL. L. REP. 173 (U.S.D.C.,
E.D. Ark. 1963). See also Jones v. Marva Theatres, Inc., 180 F. Supp.
49, 51-52 (D. Md. 1960): "Plaintiffs have asked for an injunction
so broad that the City would not be able to allow religious, social or
fraternal groups to use the Opera House for a single day for their
own purposes if they limit admission to members or other ticket
holders. Frederick is not a large city, with the many private facilities
available in metropolitan areas. Racial equality can be achieved
without an injunction which prohibits any private meeting on public
property at any time."
Mitchell v. Boys Club of Metropolitan Police, 157 F. Supp. 101 (D.D.C.

1957).
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of the Negro race or one made up only of members of the white
race, be enjoined because a person of a different race was not permitted if he so chose, to displace one of the members of such a
foursome?
The answer is that as long as applications of other private
groups for the use of the facilities are not denied solely because of
racial or religious reasons, and permission is granted to all applicants on the same basis, the requirements for eligibility of membership of any particular group may be as strict as 3the
group sees
fit, even including racial or religious qualifications. 26
A federal court similarly held that a private athletic league using
city facilities for baseball and other games for boys need not desegregate. The court observed:
[T]here is no basis for an injunction against the City requiring the
desegregation of the Babe Ruth League over which the City has
no controL ... The mere granting of permission to a certain team
to play at a park on a certain day or days is quite different
from a long term exclusive lease of the park. It is true that the
City could deny the League the use of the baseball fields unless it
integrated its teams. But there is nothing in the United States
Constitution to require the City to do so. The leagues are voluntary
associations and the members are free to choose their own associates.... 'It has not yet been held to be unconstitutional for individuals to prefer to associate with others of their own race, class,
background, or, if you like, prejudices.' And there is no reason for
the City to interfere with such freedom
of choice-or freedom of
3 27
association as it is sometimes called.
The right of private businesses to permit segregation on the
premises ought to be considered even more clear. A federal court
has remarked:
326
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Statom v. Board of Comm'rs, 8 RACE REL. L. REP. 175, 177 (Md. Cir.
Ct. 1963), rev'd on other grounds, 233 Md. 57, 195 A.2d 41 (1963). On
appeal, the Maryland Court of Appeals ruled that if the club habitually uses public school playgrounds and parks to play ball in without
charge, with the permission of public officials in charge of these
facilities, the club is required by the fourteenth amendment not to
discriminate against Negroes. This author believes this ruling to be
erroneous. However, the court said: "The cost of public buildings,
school buildings, schoolhouses and playgrounds are paid from public
funds and such buildings and playgrounds may not, systematically
and habitually (as distinguished from an occasional or casual use),
be utilized, or permitted to be utilized, on a basis of racial discrimination. We do not wish the above ruling to be interpreted as a holding
that every organization or association which occasionally or casually
uses, or is permitted to use, public property must be conducted on a
nonsegregated basis .... A mere casual or occasional use of, or permission to use, public facilities by a private organization does not
'involve' the State in the conduct and affairs of the organization to
such 'significant extent' as to require the private organization to operate on a nonsegregated basis." Id. at 66-67, 195 A.2d at 47.
Wood v. Vaughan, 209 F. Supp. 106, 114 (W.D. Va. 1962).
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In their private affairs, in the conduct of their private businesses,
it is clear that the people themselves have the liberty to select their
own associates and the persons with whom they will do business,
unimpaired by the Fourteenth Amendment. Indeed, we think that
such liberty3 28is guaranteed by the due process clause of that
Amendment.

Even the fact that the business is a public utility should not prevent the owner from permitting people to segregate themselves on
it as they choose. The Scottish Court of Session, in a context having
nothing to do with race relations, has pointed out that a railway
has the right
to assign seats on a basis other than "first-come, first29
served."
An instructive case which reviews the entire matter was decided by the High Court of Ontario. In Brazeau v. CanadianPacific
R.W. Co.,830 five business associates were traveling on a train talking about matters of interest to themselves but to nobody else. One
of them left temporarily to go to the lavatory. While he was there,
the train stopped at a station. Plaintiff got on and came into the
car. He saw the seat vacant and sat down. Before sitting he was
told that this seat was occupied by somebody in the lavatory and
asked to take a vacant seat nearby. In the words of the court:
"Whether there was something in the state of his health or his
business which rendered him disregardful of the ordinary courtesies of life, or whether the plaintiff is by nature or education
an ill-mannered boor, does not appear. Whatever the cause, he
refused to comply with this most usual and reasonable request-he
33
said he did not care, and insisted upon occupying this seat." '
Shortly afterwards, the seat was reclaimed by the fifth man
who returned from the lavatory. The five associates explained to
828 Browder v. Gayle, 142 F. Supp. 707, 715 (M.D. Ala. 1956), af"d, 352
U.S. 903 (1956).
329 Scott v. Great North of Scotland Ry. Co., 22 R. 287, 291, 32 Scot.
L.R. 218 (Ct. of Sess. 1895), where Lord M'Laren said: "I do not
think that because a train is drawn up at a station and the doors are
left open, and passengers may be in the habit of taking seats that
please them, that this amounts to an abandonment by the company
of its right to regulate its traffic by assigning seats to passengers in
the way which they find to be convenient. It is not like the case of
selling seats at a theatre, where ... the seats are of an unequal value,
and it is an implied term of the contract that whoever first gets
possession of a seat is entitled to keep it during the performance.
The contract of carriage makes it necessary that the railway company should regulate the seats of the passengers, and we know that
it is quite common to reserve particular carriages for particular
classes of passengers, for ladies travelling alone, or for invalids, or
even for no special reason...."
830 11 Ont. W. R. 136 (1908).

831 Id. at 137. The court also called him an "ill-conditioned and selfish

boor."
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the plaintiff that they were discussing matters of common interest
and asked him to change to another vacant seat. Plaintiff adamantly
refused and told the fifth man to go to a vacant seat elsewhere in
the car. The man then got the conductor, who, after hearing the
matter, told plaintiff to change to a vacant seat in the car. When
plaintiff continued obstinate, the conductor removed him by force,
resulting in his suit for damages against the railroad.
The plaintiff claimed that he had an absolute right to take any
vacant seat in the car and that nobody had the right to interfere
with his possession of the seat once occupied by him. The court
agreed that if he had this right, he was entitled to exercise it for
the purpose of annoying the other passengers, as the court found
his purpose to be. But the court held that the railway had the
absolute right to decide where to sit any particular passenger,
and that as long as it offered the plaintiff a seat equally as good as
the one he was called upon to vacate, it was his duty to comply
with the request of the appropriate railway official. The court
reasoned:
It would indeed be intolerable if the law were different. There
must be some authority to determine, and to determine on the
spot, between two persons contending over a seat, and that authority can only
be the conductor, who is 'to control and conduct the
33 2
passengers.

And, although this case was decided 60 years ago, the court added
some thoughts which are very current:
That intolerance of personal restraint characteristic of our age
and clime cannot be permitted to interfere with the company's
management of their traffic, and the people at large must benefit
by an orderly management of such traffic by those who are responsible for it. Some one must be charged with333such management,
and that duty is best left with the company.

It is difficult to see why the principles of this case should not
extend to race relations. It is poor manners for persons of any
race to thrust their association on any people who do not desire
such association, and the reasons for rejecting them are immaterial,
as everyone is entitled to his own preferences. There is no reason
why such enforced association, which in any other context but
ethnic relations would be deemed an intolerable imposition only
engaged in by "ill-mannered boors" should enjoy a higher legal
standing than the right of everyone to select his company in both
public as well as private places. It is difficult to imagine what
Negroes can gain by perpetual irritation of such white persons as
332

Id. at 141.

333 Id. at 142.
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prefer not to have them around. Such tactics can only convert what
might have been indifferent disdain into positive ill-will. Whatever
short-term psychic dividends this pays are distributed out of the
general good-will assets of the white community, this depleting
long-term good-will. For a minority, this is indeed a myopic policy.
Negroes have the most to gain by having their rights fixed
according to immutable legal rules rather than resting on the shifting sands of public opinion and sociological fads. Social science is
a two-edged sword, and not so long ago, law professors were using
it to determine how best to quarantine Negroes with rigid segregation laws. 33 4 The pendulum may shift again, and the only refuge
of any group in society, especially one which is economically depressed, is to take shelter under the general rules of law applicable to all.s 3 5 However, ultimately Negroes must make their own
decision as to what aims they desire to press for, taking the
benefits and bearing the burdens of such a decision.
However, white persons who resent compulsory integration
may justifiably criticize infringement of their rights, whatever
policies Negroes care to pursue. One of those rights is the privilege
of freedom of choice in association in both places of private accommodation and in places of public accommodation. This author
believes that no satisfactory solution of race relations or other
ethnic relations can ever be attained until such freedom is recognized, protected, and enforced.
34
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Martin, Segregation of Residences of Negroes, 32 MiCH. L. REV. 721
(1934); Minor, Constitutionality of Segregation Ordinances, 18 Va. L.
REG. 561 (1912).
See the remarks of Senator Blanche K. Bruce, a Mississippi Republican and the last Negro Senator before the end of the reconstruction
era. He said: "We believe that, clothed with all the powers and
privileges of citizens, we are able, if I may use the expression, 'to
paddle our own canoe;' and, indeed, if we fail to do so successfully
under just and proper laws, I do not know but that it is about time
for us to sink. We do not ask particular favors. We believe we have
passed that period. We believe now that we must rest our claim upon
our manhood, and that our integrity, industry, capacity and all those
virtues that go to make up good men and citizens are to measure our
success before the American people.... I hope we have passed the
critical period in our history in which race distinctions even for
protection are to be considered necessary .... " 7 CONG. REc. 2441
(1878).
To the same effect, see the remarks of Rep. Richard H. Cain, a
Negro Republican from South Carolina. 3 CONG. REC. 957, 982 (1875).

One of the leaders in the drive to emancipate the slaves, Senator
Lot M. Morrill, a Maine Republican, said that if Negroes were liberated they could take care of themselves, and would not need the
government to look after them. CONG. GLOBE, 37th Cong., 2d Sess.
1477 (1862).

